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I. INTRODUCTION
Industrialization is among the primary goals of almost all
developing nations. To achieve this, developing nations adopt
various policy tools which generally involve trade policy and
fiscal incentives. Trade policy, in particular, is highly
intertwined with the industrialization policy chosen - i.e.,
either import substitution or export-orientation.
The Philippines is among the first to embark in an import
substitution industrialization drive in the Asian Region, even
ahead of South Korea and Taiwan. Early on, South Korea and
Taiwan switched to export-oriented strategy. The Philippines,
however, despite some attempts at export promotion, still
espouses an import-substitution, inward-looking, industriali-
zation strategy.
Still, even before the assumption of the Aquino Government,
major reforms have been implemented in the major areas of trade
and industrial policies. These include the 1981-85 Tariff Reform
Program (TRP), an aborted import liberalization plan during the
same period, Batas Pambansa (BP) 391 in 1983 reforming the
Omnibus Investment Code, and various export promotion schemes
aside from the export incentives contained in SP 391.
*This is Chapter VI of a bigger study entitled "An Assess-
ment of the Performance of the Aquino Government in Selected
Policy Areas, 1986-1988.,,
**Research Fellow, PhiliDoine Institute for D_u_]_nm_ne
Studies (PIDS).
Since the Aquino Government took over in 1986, further ,.
reforms have been undertaken in thesepolicy areas. For example,
all export taxes (except for logs) were removed. Many more items
were liberalized. Three Executive Orders (EOs) and a Republic
Act (Tariff Bill} were enacted effecting tariff changes. A new
Omnibus Investment Code was passed (EO226) in 1987.
This paper attempts to assess the state of trade and
industrial policy and analyze the reforms which have been
implemented during the first three years of the Aquino
Administration. Specifically, the study covers the period from
1986 to 1988. AS such, _he major policies in the area of Trade
and Industry, with focus on the important policy reforms, are
identified. These are then evaluated with respect to:
(a) how consistent they are to stated objectives and, when
relevant, other national objectives, and
(b) their impact - qualitative and, when feasible,
quantitative - on certain important economic variables.
The paper is divided into four sections to cover the four
main policy areas in Trade and Industry. The first section
reviews and assesses the trade policy situation, presenting and
evaluating the reforms undertaken in tariff poli:cy and import
liberalization program. It also examines some proposed policy
changes, adopted or otherwise, to gauge the: liMely policy
direction the government would take. Their COnsistency With
stated and other national objectives is discussed. The second
section deals with the exchange rate policy and its impact on
trade and industry. The third section evaluates the 1987 Omnibus
Investment Code (OIC), particularly with respect to its impact on
factor prices and incentives to exports. Finally, the fourth
section describes and analyzes the major export promotion schemes
aside from the export incentives provided in the 1987 01C under
the Board of Investment (BOI).
II. REVIEW OF THE PHILIPPINE TRADE POLICY: 1986-1988
Starting in 1981, even before t_e assumption of the Aquino
Government, major trade reforms have been implemented, the most
notable of which is the 1981-85 Tariff Reform Program (TRP). It
would have been accompanied by an import liberalization scheme if
not for the Balance-of-Payments (BOP) crisis which erupted in the
latter half of 1983. Amid some degree of controversy, the
commitment to liberalize imports survived in the new government
under the Aquino Administration. There were instances which
indicate some wavering of purpose, but on the whole, a number of
trade reforms have been undertaken since the Kquinogovernmen6
_took over. Perhaps, the most important of these has been the
removal of all export taxes (except for logs) which imposed a
heavy burden on the large agricultural sector.
3A. The Tariff and Trade!p01i_ Situation: 1986-1988
As part of the strategy enunciated in the Philippine Medium-
•erm Plan, government-policy in'the area • of tariffs and-trade is
supposed"! to move towards _the direction- of greater £_ade
liberalization_ This implies a move towards a more uniform
tariff range_ and _._the eventual removal of all quantitative
restrictions on,imports except for those which are •clearly for
seeurity, and=health and safety reasons. . • ..... _ _
The rationale for such a strategy could be found in the
heart of economics and iprevious studies sh0wing the•great burden
and costs of protection. Protection i- via _ariffs and, mare
seriously, import controls .... distorts prices with greatly
adverse •.•ConseqUences •. :••Past studies have shown how price
distortions created by the past trade-• protectionist policies
discriminated heavily against agriculture in favor Of
manufacturing (mainly the finishing stage, import substitution
type), against exports and labor-intensive industries £n favor of
large-scale, capital-intensive_industrieS. _ The ultimate_c0s_ of
pro:tection is thus the seriou_s mi.sallocati0n°_0f resources fthat
arise from distorted prices' -and, hence, distorted market
incentives induced by tariffs a_nd import _controls. In sum, _he
Strategy of a=freer itrade:regime espoused in the Medium-Term Plan
i[s-designed _t0 foster com?etition and•provide an even playing
field which would induce to reveal, and encourage tO devel0p,
industries • with real comparative advantage.
Contrary to the belief of some, such a strategy is also most
appropriate for anglo.eCOnOmy he_vily burdened With foreign d_bt , as
it would encourage the earning of foreign exchange (if coupled
with a realistic exohange rate •.policy). Ar:tificially making
protected import • substituting industries relatively •' more
profitable thraugn 'tariffs and iimport controls automatically
makes potentially pr6fitable exports =less attractive. ScarCe
resources would flow towards the protected sectors leaving less
resources for the potentially more profitable industries.
Studies, e. g., Bautista and Power (1979), indicate much greater
cost, in general, of saving foreign exchange by these protected
sectors than the cost of earning foreign exchange by export
industries. In other wo:rds, suppressing the demand for foreign
exchange via tariffs and import controls on the one: hand, • and
encouraging its supply on the other, are not symmetrica[. The
forme ! is by far _ more costly •••than the latter in freein_
add_tional foreign exchange. As _ a result, the net cost, at the
margin; of- producing:foreign exchange is greatly increased by
protectionist trade policies. By ridding the market of
-distgrt_ons, trade liberaliza,tion would pr0mote a more •efficient
allocation of resources and eventually lower the cost of
producing much needed foreign exchange. _/
The policy pronouncement of moving in the direction towards
greater trade liberalization, as enunciated in the Philippine
Medium-Term Development Plan, is thus based on sound economic
analysis. It isconsistent with the overall employment-oriented
and rural-based development strategy. The question now is how
actual policy formulation in the area of trade follows the policy
pronouncement and the inherent objectives therein.
In the area of tariffs, the major changes are embodied in
three Executive Orders (EO), and a Republic Act (RA) passed by
Congress. These are EO 49 (15 October 1986), EO 70 (12 November
1986), EO 306 (7 October 1987), and RA 6647 (27 July 1987).
Table 1 presents the number of tariff changes made by tariff
level.
E0 306 was solely for reducing the tariff on crude oil from
20 Percent to 15 percent. The rest effected changes on a total
of 241 tariff lines, out of which, 103 tariff lines mainly
involved a change in classification with no actual change in the
tariff level. Increase in the tariff rate was registered in 83
tariff lines, the majority of which comes from former tariff
rates of 3M and 20 percent (35 lines were raised from a previous
tariff rate of 30 percent and 29 lines from 20 percent tariff
rate). On the other hand, duties were reduced for 55 tariff
lines, almost half of which were from a 20 percent tariff rate.
The Tariff Co_nission-PIDS project (1989) computed the
effect of these changes on average tariffs by sector. The
results are presented in Table 2. 2/ Several weighting schemes
were used by the project. _3/ Two--of these are: (i) free-trade
value added, [FTVA*Qb], and (2) (2QD + M) for importables and
(2Qb - X) for exportables, [2Q+M/-X]; where Qb is the value of
This assumes, however, that the exchange rate is allowed
to seek its true value. If the exchange rate is fixed at an
unrealistically low level, imports become artificially cheap
while at the same time the price producers received for their
exports are also low. Consequently, domestic producers, whether
for exports or for home market, would not be able to compete.
The Tariff Commission (TC), under the TC-PIDS joint
project, computed average tariffs and Effective Rates of
Protection using the 127 x 127 Input-Output Category.
-3/
weighting has always been a problem. This is discussed in
a special paper in Bautista and Power (1979).
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production in border prices, M is imports and X is exports. 4/
Although the magnitudes resulting from the two sets of weights
differ, the overall structure and direction indicated by both
estimates are more or less the same. We then present results
using only one set of weights - that using free trade value-
added (See Table 2).
Table 2 shows a slight increase in the average tariff for
all importables from 30.2 percent in 1985 (i.e., the period prior
to changes) to 30.8 percent in 1986, before going down in 1988 to
30.1 percent. Average export tax, on the other hand, was reduced
by half from 4.5 percent in 1985 to 2.2 percent in 1986 with the
removal of all export taxes except for logs. Thus, overall
average tariffs (i.e., for both exportables and importables),
using book rates, rose from 14.6 percent in 19.85 to 15.5 percent
in 1988.
:[
Comparing across major sectors, in 1985, manufacturing
received the highest nominal protectionat around 20.1 percent,
followed by agriculture at around 9.9 percent, fishing at 5.6
percent, mining at 3.4 percent and lastly, logging and other
forestry at -17.8 percent. The negative average tariff in
logging and forestry could be explained by the 20 percent export
tax on logs which was imposed for environmental and conservation
reasons and to capture rents. (These have beenargued to be at
most second-best 3ustification for the export: tax, given an
inadequate forest taxation capability.) The average tariff in
mining was low since a large part of it was exportable. Even
considering only importables, the average tariff was s£ill lower
at 16.6 percent for mining compared to the overall average of
3@.2 percent, as mining products are mainly raw materials and/or
intermediate inputs which were generally taxed at lower rates.
But more important than these considerations, the larger part of
the population belong to the agricultural and fishing sectors.
Thus, the more significant difference was between manufacturing
on the one hand, and agriculture and fishing on the other. It is
interesting to note, however, that average t_riff for importable
agriculture was much higher at 46.1 percent than that for
importable manufacturing at 28.5 percent. Still, because
agriculture is a net exporting sector, average tariff for
agriculture was less than half that for manufacturing.
Within manufacturing, large disparities were also present --
highest for paper, rubber and plastic products at 36.6 percent,
chemicals and chemical products at 27.7 percent, and metals and
4_/
The second set of weights is designed to represent
marginal imports andexports, the ideal weights to use, assuming
(1) that home demand elasticities are twice that of home supply
elasticities, and (2) that these elasticities are uniform across
sectors.
Table2; AVERASETARIFFANDSTANDAROEVIATION8YMAJORGROUP
(EXPORTABLES& I PORTABLES)
Usingbookrats
WE,used:FTVA= Ob
1985 1986 1988
SectorStoUp ' .(i) 50 (i) SO (1) 50
.............................. - .......................... _...............................................
83-9b < ALLSECT0RS 0,•14570.2109 6.1593 9,1927 •g.15540,!907
Ex_ortables -B.9452 0.0697=0,0222.0.0625 -0°0222 0,0628
Importab]es 0.3021 0.1560 0,3081 0.1233 0,3010 0.1260
03-22 ASRICULTUREgFIRHINO& FORESTRY 8.0353 0,2272 g.0199 0,1538 0,0214 0,1561
ExportabIee -0.0685 0,0840-0.04230.0816 -0,0423 0.9816
]=portables 0.4677 9,0734 8.2784 0.1968 8,2865 8,i042
83-I_ Agriculture 0.8994 9.2483 _.972S 9,1151 9.8725 8.1k_I
Exportables -8.g_66 8.8678 9.9099 8.8898 0.0880 0,8_8_
Importables 8.4611 9,8819 8,2487 9.8_91 0,2487 8.0_!_i
19-28 F_shing., 0.0553 8,1670 0,0480 0.!i73 = 0.g525 0._438
Exportables -8.6871 0.08% 0,0880 g,ggg9 9,_998 8,_800
Impo_tabies 0,4992 8.0818 0._876 g.1443 0,4245 9.9962
21=22 Loggingandotherforestryactivities-9.1778 9.1141-0.1778 8.1141-0,1778 0,1!11
£xportables _0.2698 8.8888 -0,2888 g.ggg8 -9,2990 8,0080
Importables 9,4972 0.8990 0.4072 6.8899 9.4672 0.9600
23-27 HIRING 8.9341 g.8696 9.0341 9.9698 d.6341 8.8696
Exportables 9,0988 0.9808 8.0980 8,8886 9._890 8,8880
Importables 0,1660 9,9499 6,1660 9,0499 0,1660 8,9409
28-96 flANUFACTURIN6 6.2911 6.1859 9.2284 6.1753 8.2'2199.17i2
Exportables -9.022B 9.83_7 0.9889 8.9669 0.0909 9,09_0
Importables 0.284? 6.1456 0._148 9.1241 9.3959 9.1277
28_45 Foodprocessing 0.2891 6.2973 0,2539 9,1859 8,2428 0,1866
ExportabIes -g,0394 6.8418 9,9899 9,8989 0:,0868 0,_098
Importables 0,2899 6.1699 0.3492 6,1191 0.3339 0,1321
46-59 BeveragesandTobacco 8.2543 8,25H 0,254_ 6.2569 0,2_4_ 0.2589
Exportablee 0,9888 8,8899 9,6999 8.9089 9.8089 9,98_8
Importablee 0,5899 9.8860 0,3889 9,9869 9,5889 9,8969
continuationof Table 2 ....
1985 1986 1988
SectorGroup (1) 5D (i) SD (I) SO
...................................................................................................
51-53 Textile andFont.ear 6.1106 0,1688 6,1659 6,1610 9.1956 6.1610
Exportab]es 9,9666 6,6666 9,6666 9,6699 9,686 D,OOOB
|aport.hies R,3655 6,8317 9,3472 6,6463 8._472 9.9463
56-56 Hoodand.nod products -I,0199 _,O2B0" 0.0698 0,00n 0.HH B.HN
Exportables -0.0199 0.9206 9,9600 0.9M0 0.H66 0.00H
leportables : ..............
_9-66 Paper_rubber,leather_ plastic prdts, 0,3667 6,1%4 0,5717 8,1491 9.3669 B,1469
Exportables 0.8160 0,0666 6,0009 0.6896 0,0060 0.9009
Ieportables 0.4967 6.9966 0.4344 0,0799 6.4059 8,0677
67-75 Cheeica|sandchemicalproducts 6,2769 0,1126 9,2658 D.1198 9,2636 9.1178
Export.hies ............
Ieportables 0.276? 0,1126 6.2639 6.1199 9.2639 6.1198
76-79 Ho_-ietallic oineralprodu:ts 9.2162 0,0926 0,2182 0.9626 6.2182 0,0626
Export.hies 9,8999 6,6966 0.0000 9,9000 0.0009 0,080
Iiportables 6,2221 9.9779 0.2221 0,9779 0.2221 0,9779
86-82 Basic metals andmetal products 9,2792 6,6975 0.2_13 8,1114 9,2513 6.1114
Exportables 0.0990 0.0000 0,9090 9.6906 0.6666 9.9966
Import.hies 9,2750 0,6915 6,25_7 6,1972 6,25_7 9.1672
6_-91 Bach.incl. eleoLrl eqpt, transport eqpt, 9.1971 6,1337 9,1?TI 0,1537 6,1971 0.1337
ExpnrtabIes 0.0006 9.9000 6,0066 9,6006 9,9966 9.6969
Inportables 6,2446 0.1629 0,2446 9,1027 6.2446 6.1629
92-96 Hiscellaneousmanufactures 6.2219 0,1512 6.2127 9.1419 9.2127 D.1419
Exportab|es 8,0099 0,0696 6.6609 0.0H0 6.0909 0.9000
leportabIes 6.314_ 6.9576 6.3013 9.0426 0,301_ 0,042_
(1) leighted AverageTariff
SO- StandardDeviation
9metal products at 27.@ percent, and lowest for wood and wood
products at -2.0 percent • and textile and footwear at ii.i
percent. Of course, overall, the largest disparity was still
between exportables and importables, regardless of which sectors
they belong to.
The tariff changes between 1986 and 1988 brought about
changes in the nominal tariff structure. The changes, in
general, were minimal. The biggest change occurred in importable
agriculture whose average tariff went down • from 46.1 percent in
1985 to 24.1 percent in 1986 then•remained the same in 1988.
This was largely due, however, not to the tariff changes, but to
the indirect tax realignment between imports and local
products. _5/ Before the realignment, agriculture received a
substantial additional protection from differential sales tax --
imports were levied 10 to 25 percent sales tax over a mark-up of
25 percent while•local agricultural products were imposed only a
one percent sales tax. In contrast, manufacturing products
(except for those levied specific sales taxes such as tobacco
products) were generally imposed the same percentage sales tax
except for the mark-up in the case of imports. Thus the
realignment of indirect taxes implied a much greater reduction of
protection in agriculture than in manufacturing. This is not to
imply that the indirect tax realignment is underivable. On the
contrary, it is consistent with the move towards a more uniform
protectio n structure.
On the other hand, average tariff for importable
manufacturing even went up from 28.5 percent in •1985 to 31.4
percent in 1986 before slightly going down to 30.5- percent in
1988, which is still higher than the original level. The main
beneficiary of this positive change was the importable food
processing sector -- from 29.0 percent in 1985 to 34.9 percent in
1986 and 33.4 percent in 1988. The average tariff for importable
paper, rubber, and plastic products also went up in 1986 but it
went back to almost its original level in 1988.
Fishing is another interesting case. The average tariff for
importable fishing went down from 49.•9•percent in 1985 to 38.8
percent in 1986, then it went up again, though not to its
original level, to 42.5 percent in 1988.
In sum, then•, tariff changes have been minimal and did not
alter much the tariff protection structure. Nevertheless, it
......seems that whatever• effect there was, appears to be opposite what
should ha_ been if the policy direction of more uniform tariff
were strictily followed. This is, however, an incomplete picture
of the protection structure. The tariff changes were principally
intended as a temporary adjustment measure to accompany the
• 5/
This was implemented in October 1985, i.e., before Aquino.
10
import liberalization which has occurred. (Although whether it
remains temporary has become more and more questionable). Thus_
such movement of the tariff book rate in the opposite direction
could be expected. Furthermore, the standard deviation around
the average tariff went down between 1985 and 1988, implying less
tariff variation. Still, the results show that certain sector
has bee_ more favored than others in terms of increasing nominal
p_otection.
Any program of tariff reform would be meaningless without a
complementary plan to remove import restrictions. Tariff
reduction where quantitative restriction to import (QR) remains,
for example, merely implies a transfer of tariff revenues for the
government to private rents in the hands of those who are able to
secure the license to import -- obviously a worse situation than
before. What follows, then, is an assessment of how the Aquino
government performed in the area of import liberalization.
Table 3 gives the aggregate number of items regulated,
libeJ[alized, and newly regulated by year from 1977 to 1988.
There are shortcomings in using such a frequency index to gauge
the degree of restrictiveness of the trade regime. It assumes
that all items are equally important and that all import controls
a_e uniformly administered and uniformly restrictive. Still, the
large difference in the figures before and after 1985 gives
enough indication as to the overall direction of change. In
1985, more than 34 percent of the total number of PSCC
(Philippine Standard Commodity Classification) lines were
Kegulated. With the import liberalization episodes from 1986 to
1988, this went down to 17.3 percent in 1986, 14.2 percent in
1987 and !0.2 percent in December 1988.
Table 4 presents a more disaggregated picture of the
covenage of quantitative restrictions -- referred to in the table
as N_M (Non-tariff Measures) coverage -- by major sectors. In
1985: the NTM coverage in agriculture and fishing was around
30.6 percent, close to that in manufacturing with 32.1 percent.
Fishing, beverages and tobacco, and food processing sub-sectors
had the highest NTM coverage at 95.7 percent, 84.2 percent and
44.8 percent _, respectively.
With the removal of quantitative restrictions from 1986 to
1988, the NTM coverage went down substantially in 1988. Based
on f_equency inde_ alone, there appears to have been a greater
liberalization in agriculture as compared with manufacturing.
The NTM coverage went down to only 1.6 percent for agriculture
while that for manufacturing went down to 9.4 percent. (These
figures are not based on an exhaustive list as certain I-O
secto_ considered nontraded, affecting more particularly the
agric_Itural sectors, were left out. Still the difference
between the estimate for agriculture and that for manufacturing
is q_ite substantial to warrant such conclusion.) Again,
Table 3: NUMBER OF ITEMS REGULATED, LIBERALIZED
AND NEWLY REGULATED BY YEAR, 1977 TO 1988
Total Number Newly -- Liberalized NO. of Regulated
Regulated Regulated Items as Percent
of total number
of PSCC lines
(%)
1977 1892 47 - 33.5
1978 1926 34 - 34.2
1979 2031 104 - 36.0
1980 2032 1 - 36.0
1981 1771 2 263 31.4
1982 1438 277 610 25.5
1983 1988 598 48 35.3
1984 1994 6 - 35.4
1985 1924 - 70 34.1
1986 973 - 951 17.3
1987 802 - 171 14.2
1988 673 - 129 11.9
Dec. 1988 579 - 94 10.2
Table4: It_ COVE_EBY_t_t?_
: : 19f4 : 1985 : 1986 : lgf7 : 19_
......--...........................................:Totalfie: ..........: ............: ............: ...- ......,.................
: of PJ_Cs,:gSOCsHTH :FeCes N_ :P_Cs HIff :P_C_s H_ :PSCCs HTH'
I/O _ ECT0 R :in se_ter:_/HTHsCoverage:_/ HIHsCoverage:N/ffT_ Coverage:w]HTHsCoverage:w/HTHsCever_
: : (_) : (t) : (_) : (t) : (_)
0_-%_LLS_CTOR$ : 5,498 1790 32.56 172{)" 31.28 783 $4.24 614 11,17 4Be 8.82
03-2"2_ICLIL'R_E,FIg_]__/10FOI_TRY : 406 122 30.05 lib 29.06 33 8.13 _ 7.39 14 3.45
0_'13_@'ic_lti:,re : 323 87 26,% 84 26,0L 24 7.43 21 6,50 S 1.55
t9-20fishi_ : 23 22 %.6S 22 95,65 8 34.78 6 .TA,70 0 34.28
21-22Logan9AOLhere : 60 13 21.67 12 20,00 i l _67 1 1.6T 1 1,67
23-27_HtHG : 108 J 0,93 J 0.93 1 0,93 l 0,9_ t 0.93
28-96ItWJF_TL_I_ ', 4.9_4 1667 _,45 1601 _2.12 749 IS._ 5_ 1L70 470 9._
28-45Foodpro(_-_sin9 : S..x6 26B 50,00 240 44.78 82 15._0 80 14,93 65 12,[3
46-50Beveragesa_dTob_c_ " 57 52 91.23 48 84.2! ? [2,28 2 _.51 0 0.00
51-55Textileandfeett_sar : 706 27_ 39.09 268 _7.% I_9 21.10 77 10.91 [ O.14
56-58_ and_ products : 164 18 L0.98 IS 9,15 0 O,® 0 {).00 {) 0.00
59-66P_per,_er,_eatlmr&plastic prod, : 491 216 4_99 203 41.34 13 i4.87 15 _,05 15 3.05
67-75_hmicaleandchemicaloro_cts : 676 129 lg.0e 129 lg._ 70 10.36 6_ 9.16 60 8.68
76-79b-zeta$1ic mineralpreducts : 2,t4 81 34.S2 79 33.76 50 21.37 40 17.09 _ 12.82
80-82Basicmetalsandutal products : 605 209 34.55 207 34.21 26 4._0 1) 1._2 7 L16
83-91ffadt,incl.ele_ctrl.&Transp.(qpt. : l,OOe 213 21.L3 2_ 21.[3 210 20.8_ 210 20.83 21O 20._
92-%lliscellaneo_Hanufactures : 507 205 40.4$ 199 .W.25 E_ [6.17 82 16.17 _ 16.17
ttote:Thecountisnoteed_auetiveasc rtainI-0sezters,c_sideredhe-traded,ere leftout.
Source:Tariff _omissi®
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however, we should bear in mind that within manufacturing, the
changes vary. The whole manufacturing sector is not uniformly
affected.
There was virtually no liberalization in electrical
machinery and transport equipment, where the NTM index fell only
slightly from 21.i percent in 1985 to 20.8 percent in 1988. In
1988, this sector has the second highest NTM index. Fishing
remains to have the highest NTM coverage at 34.8 percent. Non-
metallic mineral products and food processing are the other two
sectors with higher than average NTM coverage. Again, the
limitations of such an index should be borne in mind. Still, as
in the case of tariff Changes, the figures give some indication
as tO which sector has bees more favored than others.
To capture more adequately the effects _of both tariff and
non-tariff measures on nominal protection, an attempt was made
by the TC-PIDS project to estimate tariff equivalents of non-
tariff measures by comparing domestic and border prices whenever
feasible and applicable. This will reveal more sufficiently the
nominal protection afforded by both tariff and non-tariff
measures and the magnitude and direction of change effected by
both tariff changes and the removal of quantitative restrictions.
The results are presented in Table 5. (Again, several sets of
weights were used by the TC-PIDS project. As in the case of
using book rates, the results from the two sets of estimates are
similar with respect to the trend and direction of change.
Again, as such, only one set of results is used in the
discussion.)
The more important estimates are those for importables
(i.e., excluding exportables). The average tariff for
importables (all sectors) went down in both 1986 and 1988. The
decrement was, however, small -- from 46.6 percent in 1985 to
45.9 percent in 1986, to 43.9 percent in 1988. This seems to
imply that the degree of liberalization is not as grea_ as that
indicated earlier by the frequency index. Thi_ finding is quite
plausible for two main reasons. First, the degree of
restrictiveness of non-tariff measures and their relative
importance with respect to production and consumption vary across
commodities. It is logical to assume that liberalization would
start with those commodities of least importance and with least
resistance to change. Second, the government replaced, for many
cases, QRs with tariffs (although perhaps not by as much as their
full tariff equivalent as the tariff range is limited to 10 to 50
percent).
The data could, of course, be seriously flawed. More
important than this possibility, however, which should qualify
this conclusion is the fact that the figures are average.
Implicit tariffs vary a_ross sectors, across commodities.
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Table5: AVERA6ETARIFFANDSTANDARDDEVIATIONBYHAJQR6ROUP
(EXPORTABLES& [MFORTASLES]
Usingprice coaparison
it.used=FTUR! gb
I985 I786 1980
S_tor6roup (1) SD 9!) SO (1) SO
..........................................................................................................
93-% ALLSEcToRs 0.2]63 6.3592 9.2242 6.3984 6,2149 6,3662
,,Exportab]es -9,6462 9°9383 -9,9227 9.BgRR-9.8227 9.9696
Isportables 9,4669 9.3899 9,4592 8,3426 Q,4391 g,3425
03-22 ASRICULTURE,FISHING& FORESTRY g,6569 9_2795 6,9567 9,2344 0,9582 9,23_7
.ExportahIee -9.9671 9.9839 -8,6497 9,9595 -9.9407 9,_805
Importables 6,5575 9,1_79 6,4496 0,2467 8,4575 9,2339
9_-1_ AgricuILure 9.1395 9.3167 '8,1445 0,2614 9.1445 9.2614
Exportables -9.6568 9,9679 6,9998 g.0969 9,9696 g,OH9
IsportabIes 6.5897 9.iSbI 9.46?2 9.2636 _,4692 9.2636
19-29 Fishing 9.9555 g.lbSg 9,9477 9.i373 9.9525 9.I438
Exportablee -9.B971 9.9996 9.9999 9.9699 9,9999 8.9999
ImportabIes 9.4?92 6.9919 9.3876 6.144_ 9.424_ 9.6962
21-22 Loggingandotherforestryactivities-9,1767 9.1167-9.1767 6.1167-9,1767 9.11b7
ExportabIes -_.2999 9.9969 -9.2996 a.9999 -9,2999 9.9969
IiportabIes 9.4972 9.9D99 9.¢972 9.9699 9.4672 9.9999
23=27 MIHIN6 9.g42I 9.9754 9,0423 9.9754 9.9423 9.9754
ExportabIes 9.9999 9.9969 6.9999 9.9699 9,6699 9,9999
Impertables g,I6b9 g.6465 0,1669 9.6465 9.1669 9.6465
2R-g6 HANUFACTURIH6 9,3129 6.4_83 6,3247 9,4959 9.367_ 9.39?9
Exportabtes -9.9222 9,9_5_ 6.9696 9.gROg 6,6H6 g,9Og9
Iaportables 6,4577 9,4809 9,4663 0.4117 9,4415 9,4116
28-45 •Foodprocessing 9,2963 6,2294 0,2575 9,1979 8,2477 9,1996
Exportab]es -9,636R 6,9413 6.9699 9,9669 6,6999 9.968
Ioportables 9,2?65 6.1995 9,3559 9,L39_ 9._399 9.1517
46-59 Bore;agesandTobacco 9,2445 9.2499 g,2445 9.2499 9,2445 6.2499
Exportab]ee 9.0|96 6.9999 9.999D I.DN6 9,9699 9.9699
Importables 9.5666 g.gg6 9.5669 9.9969 9,5966 9.6909
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continuationf Table5 ....
198_ i086 IgSB
5actorGroup (I) 5D (I) SO iI) SD
............................................................................................................
51-55 TextileandFootwear 0.2120 0._644 0.2014 0.3527 0.0940 0.1586
Expnrtables 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0._000 0,0000
laportables 0.7?15 0.1927 0.7522 0.2241 B.3542 0.0495
56-98 Woodandwoodproducts -0.0230 0.0178 0.0000 0.0000 0.000_ 0.@000
ExportabIes- -0.0230 0.0198 0.0000 0.0000 0,_000 @,000B
[mportable_ ............
59-66 Paper,robber,leather_ plastic prdts. 0.5699 0.4710 0.4_55 0.2374 0.3646 0.1790
Exportables 0.0000 _.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Importables 0.6783 0.&612 0.5220 0.1496 0.4370 0.0822
67-75 Chemicalsandchemicalproducts 0.4020 0.0804 0._947 0.0%2 0.5947 8.0962
Exportables ............
Importsbles _.402_ _._8_4 4.3947 0._962 0,3747 _.0%2
76=79 Nonletallicmineralproducts B,8197 0._% 0.7762 0,1987 0,7762 0,19_7
Exportablea 0.0000 0.0000 _._000 0.0000 0.0000 _,00_0
Importables 0.8418 0._814 0.7971 0.1547 0.7971 0.1547
80_82 Basicmetalsandmetalproducts 0.4077 0.D09S 0.2!89 0.1011 0.2189 0.1011
Exportables 0.000_ _._000 0.0000 0.00_0 0,0000 0,0000
Importables 0,_003 0.9056 0,2249 e.0%0 0.2245 0.0960
8S-91Math.incl.electrleqpt,transporteqpt.0.0776 1,5B68 0.5976 I._068 0.D976 1.9068
Exportables 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Importables 1.010_ 1.8497 1.010) 1,8497 1.0103 1.8497
92-96 Miscellaneousmanufactures 0.4_39 0.g_87 0,1025 0.!634 0.1_25 B.1634
£xportables _,_000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0,0000
Importables 0._0_5 0._176 0.05_2 0._176 0,0_62
{1) Weighted'AverageTariff
• SO- 8LandardOeviation
• t
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The largest deciine in average tariff occurred in
miscellaneous manufactures (from 90 to 32 percent), basic metals
and metal products (from 50 to 22 percent) and textile and
footwear (from 79 to 35 percent). A sector which stood out is
food processing whose average tariff even rose between 1985 and
1988 -- from around 30 percent in 1985, to 36 percent in 1986, to
34 percent in 1988. For the rest of the manufacturing sectors,
there was a small decline in average tariff similar to the
overall trend, or no change at all. The decline in average tariff
for importable agriculture was greater than the overall change
but its average level remained higher than average tariff for al_
importables. Thus, while there seems to be greater import
liberalization in agriculture (as compared tO manufacturing)/
importaDle agriculture remains, on average, to receive higher
nominal protection.
Including both exportables and importables shows a much
lower average tariff for agriculture than for manufacturing.
Because of the removal of export taxes, however, average tariff
for agriculture improved, increasing slightly from 13.9 percent
in 1985 to 14.4 percent in 1988. In contrast, average tariff for
manufacturing went down from 31.2 percent in 1985 to 30.8 in 1988
(rising to a little extent in between to 32.5 percent in 1986).
Many other observations could be gleaned from the tables
thus far presented. For example, the ratio between average
tariff using price comparison and that using book rate could be
computed, as done in Table 6. The table shows the overall ratio
going down from 1985 to 1988, which could be indicative of a
decreasing reliance on non-tariff measures. Those noted so far,
however, already provide some _ndication of the impact of policy
changes in terms of direction, magnitude and structure. The next
section will focus on the impact of these changes on the EPR
structure.
B. The Effective Rate of Protection (EPR)_Structure:
1986-1988
More important than the nominal protection on output derived
from tariffs and import control is the effective protection on
value-added for a particular activity resulting from tariffs and
import controls on both output and inputs. Basically, the
effective protection rate (EPR) is defined as the percentage
eacess of protected value-added over non-protected value-added.
Thus, if Pbjand Phi are the non-protected prices of the output j
and input i respectively (which, thus, should equal the
respective world prices at the country's border for tradable
goods), tj and ti are the nominal protection on output J and
input i respectively, then,
Pbj (l+tj) - E Pbi (l+ti)Aij
EPR =
Pbj - E PbiAij _'
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Table 6: RATIO OF AVERAGE TARIFF USING PRICE COMPARISON
TO AVERAGE TARIFF USING BOOK RATE
(Importables)
Wt. Used: FTVA * Qb
Sector Group 1985 1986 1988
03-96 ALL SECTORS 1.5425 1.4904 1.4588
03-22 AGRICULTORE,FISHING & FORESTRY 1.1920 1.6149 1.5969
03-13 Agriculture 1.2594 1.9493 1.9493
19-20 Fishing a/ 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
21-22 Logging and other forestry activities a/ 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
23-27 MINING 1.0054 1.0054 1.0054
28-96 MANUFACTURING 1.6065 1.4850 1.4475
28-45 Food processing 1.0228 1.0192 1.0180
46-50 Beverages and Tobacco a/ 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
51-55 Textile and Footwear 2.1655 2.1665 1.0202
56-58 Wood and wood products * ......
59-66 Paper,rubber,leather & plastic prdts. 1.6678 1.2017 1.0766
67-75 Chemicals and chemical products 1.4518 1.4962 1.4962
76-79 Non-metallic mineral products 3.7902 3.5889 3.5889
80-82 Basic metals and metal products 1.8193 1.0000 1.0000
83-91 Mach. incl. electrl eqpt, transport eqpt. 4.1305 4.1304 4.1304
-_/2-96 Miscellaneous manufactures 2.8746 1.0541 1.0541
• Purely• exportaDle.
a/
Price comparison data not available.
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Where -
Ai3 is the amount of input i going into the
production per unit of output j.
This formula has a number of variations depending on the type of
data available.
Using the estimated average tariffs by I-O sector for the
years 1985, 1986 and 1988 and the 1983 I-O coefficients, the TC-
PIDS project computed the effective protection rates for the
corresponding I-O sectors and the corresponding years. The
average EPR by major sectors were also computed again using the
free-trade value-added as weights. The results are presented in
Tables 7 to 10.
The first two tables, Tables 7 and 8, use book rates and
show the effective protection from tariffs alone. A similar
pattern as in nominal tariffs emerged. In 1985, manufacturing
received the highest effective protection at around 38.0 percent,
which was more than twice that for agriculture at 15.6 percent
and more than four times that for fishing at 7.6 percent. The
ayerage EPR for the other major sectors are even lower, with
mining at 2.8 percent and forestry at -20.0 percent. Again, for
t_e same reasons mentioned earlier in the discussion with regards
to nominal tariffs, the more important difference was between
manufacturing on the one hand and agriculture and fishing On the
other.
These figures are, however, average. There were large
variations within sectors. Foremost of this resulted from the
large disparity between exportables and importables (for any
sector). For example, in 1985, the average EPR for exportable
manufactures was -3.3 percent while that for importable
manufactures was 53°4 percent. In the same year, for exportable
agriculture, the average EPR was -6.5 percent while that for
importable agriculture was 66.8 percent -- higher even than that
for importable manufacturing.
The changes in nominal tariffs and removal of QRs from 1986
to 1988 brought about corresponding Changes in the EPR.
Estimates are presented in Table 9. While nominal tariffs (Dook
rates) rose, then fell by small amounts in 1986 and 1988, the
overall average EPR steadily decreased from 49.0 percent in
1985 to 39.4 percent in 1986 to 36.5 percent in 1988. This trend
was exhibited by all sectors except importable fishing whose
average EPR went down from 73.8 percent in 1985 to 41.4 percent
in 1986 and then went up to 45.8 percent in 1988. In addition to
the downward trend in average EPR, there was also a reduction in
the standard deviation across all sectors.
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Table 7= AVERAGEEPRANDSTANDARDDEVIATIONBYMAJOR6ROUPS
(EXPORTABLE5_ IHPORTASLES)
Usingbookrate
Sector group 1903 SO 1996 SO 1988 SO
.......................................................................................................
g3_76 ALLSECTORS 0.2733 0,4069 8,2307 1.3291 8.2254 B,3241
Exportables -0,8579 8,8955 -8.8321 0.8911 -8,8325 LD?12
Importables 0.5#47 8,3609 0.4464 B.2931 8,43&7 m.2?lS
03-22 AGRICULTURE_FISHIN6&FORESTRY 8.0656 6o3147 0,0124 0.1667 0.0142 8,1696
Exportabies -B.8820 0.0912 -0.0546 0,0908 -0,654b 0.0908
Ioportables g,6884 0.0887 0.2911 0.1132 9.3886 0.1115
83-13 AgriculLure _.1562 0,_450 0,0710 8.1220 8.0710 0.i220
Exportables -g,0646 0.0692 -0.0868 g.0049 -0.0060 0.0049
]oportables 6.6683 g,0931 B.2495 0.0605 0,2495 0.0685
19-20 Fishing g.0757 9.2496 6,0429 0.1494 0.0483 0.1376
ExporLabLes -0.0178 0.0178 -0,009_ 0.0066 -g.0096 0.6966
Importsbles 0.7_78 0,0292 g.4144 0.1505 0,4582 0.09_2
21-22 LoNging& other farestry a_tivities -g,2601 0.1511 -0,2061 0.1205 -0.2061 0.1205
Exportables -0.22% O,gggg-g.2296 0.0g00 *0.22% 0.g008
Tmportablss 6.5748 8°0600 9.4129 g.gggg 0.4120 9.6669
23-27 HINIHO 0.6281 9.1062 6.6154 6.0840 9,9154 6,0640
Exportables -9.9227 8.0027 -0.6261 6.6928 -8.0261 0,8028
Isportables 6.2245 g.0175 6.1758 6,0444 0,1750 0.0444
28-96 _AHUFACTORIHS 0,_797 6.4120 9,3493 9,3363 0.3313 6.3332
Exportsbles -6,0326 6.1008 -6.0039 0,6915 -0,8947 0.0926
ImporLables 0.3343 0.3779 0,4692 8,3922 6.4572 0.3622
29-45 Foodprocessing 0,3371 0.4219 0,3118 8.3461 0.2989 9.3491
Expertables -9.0842 6.9992 -0.0395 0.9389 -6.6416 0,6399
IiportabIes 0,49_2 0,3964 0.443_ 0.3299 9.4264 8.3277
46-50 BevertgesandTobacco 8,4_28 g,5159 0.4160 0.4997 g.4LOg
Exportables -0,6977 6.0558 -6.6879 0.6559 -0.6879
ZJportables 9.9_$8 0.060? 9,8712 0,13H 6.8912
2O
continuationof Tab]e7 ....
Bettor Group 1995 SD 1986 GD 1998 88
51-55 Textile andFootuear 0.2466 0,3786 8.1986 8,2910 8.1986 1.2900
ExportabJes 9.NOD 6.8990 I.Sl|i 0,0O01 }.Hn l.nH
Iaportables 6,9152 6,1624 9,H362 6,6329 0,H362 6.8328
56-56 Hoodandeoodproduct5 8.1385 B,8497 _,1996 D,8989 8,1988 0°8989
Exportables |,1385 6,8497 8,1968 8.8989 i.1966 0,6989
]iportab]es ............
59-66 Paper,rubber,leather_ plastic products 6.8221 6,3469 6.8128 0,372L 1.7411 8,3419
Exportables -B.D699 6.2149 -8.1889 6.9314 -9.||89 |.8314
Iiportab]ee 8.9193 8.1929 6,9133 6.2252 8.8327 0.2059
67-75 Cheiica|s andchemicalproducts 9.6623 9.3949 0,4999 6,3287 0,4989 6.3297
E_portabLes ...........
Jmportables 6.6623 g.3946 6.4999 6.3287 8.4989 0._287
76-79 Non-ietallic ainera! products 9.288] 8.i733 6.3,_8 0.14[1 0._369 D.1411
Expertables -8,8795 6.0611 -8.9815 9.0021 -0.|615 |.8621
|uportab[es |.295m 0.1&76 8._444 6.L365 6.3444 6.1388
86-92 Basiceeta]s andieta] products 9.6419 8.2449 $,5484 |.2779 6,5484 |.2779
£xportab]es -8.8434 6.8668 -8.879_ 6.6866 -8.0783 |.BHI
Tsportabies 9.8567 9.2166 6°5595 8.2673 9.5595 0.2673
83-91 Hath, incl, else, eqptftransporteqpt. 8,4839 6.4633 8.3398 0.2911 0.3398 0.2911
ExpurtabZes 8.8888 8.8668 8.8gD 8.DODg g.HB6 $,6688
[epertables 9.6865 8,4431 0,4266 6.2661 8.4266 1,2661
92-% Hiecellaneou$I_nufactures 6.4677 |,3922 O._T4_ 6,2834 6.3745 9.28_4
ExporLables 6,9641 8,HO8 -8.6185 8.OH6 -6,9195 6,9068
isportables 8.6699 6.3617 8.5_92 6,15D4 |.5382 |.1_04
S TheEPR5are lmighteduith FTVfix Ob
SO- StandardSeriaLise
Source: Tariff Cou[ss]oo
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Table 8: (I+EPR) INDEX BY MAJOR GROUPS
1985, 1986, 1988
Using book rate
1985 1986 1988
ALL SECTORS 110.13 114.93 i14.42
Exportables 81.48 90.37 90.34
Importables 133.60 135.05 134.15
AGRICULTURE, FISHING & FORESTRY 92.16 94.53 94.70
Exportables 79.40 88.27 88.27
Importables 145.34 120.55 121.44
AGRICULTURE 100.00 100.0@ 100.00
Exportables 80.90 92.81 92.81
Importables 144.29 i16.67 116.67
FISHING 93.04 97.38 97.88
Exportables 84.95 92.48 92.47
Importables 150.30 132.06 136.15
FORESTRY 69.18 74.13 74.13
Exportables 66.63 71.93 71.93
Importables 136.20 131.84 131.84
MINING 88.92 94.81 94.81
Exportables 84.53 90.93 90.93
Importables 105.91 109.79 109.79
MANUFACTURING 119.33 125.14 124.30
Exportables 83.67 93._i 92.93
Importables 132.70 137.18 136.06
Agriculture = i_0
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Fable_: AVEBABEEPKANDSTBNDARDDEVIATTONBYNAJOR6ROUP8
(E;PORTABLES_ [HPORTABLEB)
Usingprice coeparison
SectorGroup 1995 SB 1986 88 1988 80
......................................................................................................
83-96 ALLSECTORS 0.4964 1.1655 g.3937 9,7564 0.3&49 6,7084
ExportubIes -8.0691 8.6594 -8.6411 8°6325 -8,8414 0.6327
IzportabIes 1.8226 1.45B7 8.8872 0,9853 8,7514 9.8806
83-22 AGRICULTURE,FISHING&FORESTRY B.BgOg 6.3737 0.9563 B,2616 8,852! 8,2632
ExportabIes -B.6849 g,9967 -B.B579 g.9967 _8,9579 B,8967
Ioportables 8,7962 6.2988 g.483_ 8,2782 8.4928 g.2627
0_-13 Agriculture 0.2673 9.4338 9.1519 D,2999 B,151g 9.2899
Expurtab]es -8,9663 6.6695 -B.gB7B 9.0656 _O.BB7D 0,8056
TaportabIes g,8224 g,2T23 8.5961 8,2975 8.5861 B.2975
19-28 Fishing 8,9757 g,24% 8,9429 8.1494 8.948_ 8.1576
Exportab]es -8,6178 9.g178 -g.8895 B.gg66 -8,8096 B.B066
IiportabIes 6,7386 8.929_ 0.4145 0.1596 6.4583 9.09_3
21-22 Logging& other forestry activities -B.2163 9.1585 _9.2226 6.1271 -0.2226 6.1271
ExportabIes -6.2480 B,gOO8-0.2489 8.BH6 -1.2488 g.HJi
IaportabIes g,5769 g,gggO 8,#134 8.888 0,41_4 B,BgOg
23-27 HIRING -8,9820 g,14_5-6,9199 9.1248 -8.8199 8,1248
Exportabies -6.B947 0.0217 -8,8898 6.6225 -9.11898 0,8225
IaportabIes g.2419 9,9168 6.1961 8,6491 8,1661 D,8491
28-96 HAHUFACTURIRG 9.7_5 1,5895 g,6917 1,6684 6.5549 1.9898
ExportabIes -8,9445 8.1113 -6,8119 B.9999 -8,0129 D,BBg4
IzportabIes 1,9727 1.8816 9,8693 1.1724 0,8024 1.1194
28-45 Foodprocessing 0,_449 B.4685 8,3166 8,_651 8.3829 8,3861
ExportabIes -0.|995 6.0995 -6,0495 0,|405 -8_8511 8.0412
Inportabies 9.5695 6,4402 9.4525 6,3660 8,4_4_ 0,3741
46-59 BeveragesandTobacco 6.4529 9.5611 8,4286 6.5416 6,426_ 0,5416
Expnrtab]es -9.9921 8.6616 -8,0922 6,D617 -6,6922 8.B617
IsportabIes 1,8223 8,9727 8,9729 9.1273 6.9729 6.1273
23
continuationof Tab]e_Y"....
Sector6roup 17.85 SD 1966 SD 1988 fig
...............................................................................................
51-55 Textile andFootwear |,7625 1,3007 6.6109 1,1646 6.2241 6.3798
Exportables e.66H g.6ag 6.H6g g.ll0S g.ill0| B.HN
Inportables 2.6232 1.1647 2,2911 1.1176 0,6368 0.16|9
56-58 Hoodanduoodproducts 8.1562 8.2628 D.2177 0.1149 0.2177 0.i149
Exportabies 6,15D2 9.6628 6.2177 g.1147 0.2177 S.1149
liportableo .........
5%66 Paper_rubbertleather_ plastic products 2.4845 3.5963 1.3738 1.6768 [.i789 1.46&2
Exportables -8.8699/ 6.8147 -8.1987 6.9314 -6.1089 D.6314
lmportables 2.8958 3.7487 1.6722 1.6826 1.3148 1.49&9
67-75 Chemicalsandcheuical products 1.5274 1.1977 1.1977
Exportables ............
Ieportables 1.5274 1.1977 1,1777
76-79 Non-metallicmineral praducLs 1.5986 8.7989 1.5918 0.4559 1.5919 8,45_
Expartables -S.6775 8.8611 -6,0915 B.gD'Dio6,D915 9.9921
lepertables 1.6439 6.7600 1.6367 8.3679 1,6367 6.3679
96-82 Basicmetalsandmetalproducts 1.7979 1.787D 8.5536 D.3261 6.5530 9,3291
Exportables -6.6434 0.6668 -6.6783 B.DNO -0,978_ D.g|6
[sportab]es 1,8455 1,7849 0.56?3 9.3166 9.569_ 0,_160
83-91 Hath. incl. elec. eqpt,Lransparteqpt, 2.3961 6.1116 1,6947 q.1429 1.6947 4,L429
Exportab]e_ 9,6866 8,9886 8.8HD I.HU i.OOH 6,9686.
Iiportablee 4.6569 7.5121 2.8651 5.6657 2.8651 5.865?
92-96 Hiecellaneouemanufactures 1.6738 1.1246 6.5972 6,3447 1,5172 9,3447
Ezportable_ -B.H6? 9.666 -6.6245 8.81106-9.6245 6.6966
liportables 3.4863 -- 1.8827 -- 1,6927 --
t TheEPRsare eeightedwith FTVAx Ob
SD- StandardDeviation
Source: Tariff Commission
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Table _ (I+EPR) INDEX BY MAJOR GROHPS
1985, 1986, 1988
Using price comparison
1985 1986 1988
ALL SECTORS 123.45 121.09 i18.58
Exportables 77.11 83.31 83.28
Importables 167.53 157.01 152.16
AGRICULTURE, FISHING & FORESTRY 90.28 91.25 91.41
Exportables 75.80 81.93 81.93
Importables 148.78 128.87 129.70
AGRICULTURE 100.00 100.00 100.00
Exportables 77.34 86.27 86.27
Importables 150.95 130.85 130.85
FISHING 89.10 90.61 91.08
Exportab!es 81.36 86.06 86.05
Importables 143.96 122.89 126.70
FORESTRY 64.91 67.54 67.54
Exportables 62.29 65.33 65.33
Imp0rtables 130.61 122.80 122.80
MINING 82.66 85.15 85.15
Expor_ables 75.81 79.08 79.08
Importables 102.87 103.05 103.05
MANUFACTURING 143.58 139.16 135.09
Exportables 79.14 85.85 85.77
Importables 171.68 162.41 156.59
Agriculture = 100
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Protection is a relative concept. More significant than the
absolute EP_ level is what happens in the EPR in one sector
relative to another. This is indicated in Table 8 which shows
the movement in the (I+EPR) index by major sectors, with the
index for agriculture set equal to 100. The index rose for
manufacturing from 119.3 in 1985 to 125.1 in 1986, then slightly
went down but still at a higher level than in 1985 to an index of
124o3 in 1988. Thi_ seems to indicate a worsened relative
protection for agriculture with the tariff changes. In 1985,
importable agriculture had the highest index at 144.3, higher
even than the index for importable manufacturing whose index was
132.7. By 1988, the index for importable agriculture has gone
down to 116.7 while that for importable manufacturing has gone up
to 13_.i.
Thus, while the overall downward trend appears to be in the
right direction, the relative changes, specifically between
agriculture and manufacturing, seems to be contrary to the
movement towards more uniform protection, not to mention a rural-
based development Strategy.
While the implication of the changes in the book rates on
the relative protection between agriculture and manufacturing is
negative, there was, at least, some improvement in the relative
indices between importables and exportables. The index was 81.5
for exportable and 133.6 for importables in 1985. By 1988, the
indices were 90.3 and 134.2 for exportaDles and importables,
respectively.
The above estimates are based on book tariff rates alone and
do not present a complete picture. As mentioned above in the
discussion of nominal average tariffs, such results could be
expected as the changes in the book rates were primarily intended
as a temporary adjustment measure to accompany import
liberalization. The next two tables attempt to capture the
overall effect of both the tariff changes and the import
liberalization episodes from 1986 to 1988.
As expected, the EPR measure using price comparisons yielded
higher estimates of protection. In 1985, manufacturing received
the highest effective protection rate at 73..4 percent, more than
three times that for agriculture at 20.7 percent and almost ten
times that for fishing which received only 7.6 percent. Thus,
the gaps are much higher than that implied by the book tariff
rates. The divergence between importables and exportables is
even higher. The average EPR for importables was 102.3 percent
while that for exportables was -6.9 percent.
While book rates indicate that importable agriculture
received higher protection than importable manufacturing, the
opposite is indicated using price comparisons. Importable
agriculture received an EPR of around 82.2 percent, while
importable manufacturing enjoyed an EPR of around i@7.3 percent.
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Thus, while both sectors received additional protection from non-
tariff measures ( NTMs, mainly import licensing), importable
manufacturing depended much more heavily on these NTMs.
The variation in EPR within the manufacturing sector itself
is perhaps the largest, ranging from -9.8 percent for exportable
food processing to 405.1 percent for importable machinery
including electrical and transport equipment.
The tariff changes and the removal of QRs for a number of
items from 1986 to 1988 brought about changes in nominal tariffs
estimated in Table 5 and consequently on EPR. As shown in Table
9, the average EPR also went down steadily, as in the case of
using book rates alone, from 49.0 percent in 1985 to 39.4 percent
in 1986 to 36.5 percent in 1988. The decline was exhibited in
all importable sectors. At the same time, the EPR for
exportables improved with the removal of export taxes in 1986.
The gap between importables and exportables thus narrowed down to
75.1 percent and -4.1 percent respectively for the two sectors.
To illustrate more clearly the changes in EPR in relative
terms, Table 10 presents the (l+EPR) index by ma3or sectors for
1985, 1986 and 1988 as was done in Table 8 for EPR using book
rates. This time, in contrast with the results using book rates
alone, the EPR index relativ_ to agriculture declined for
manufacturing, from 143.6 in 1985 to 139.2 in 1986 to 135.1 in
1988 (Agriculture = 100).
The average and aggregate figures could hide a lot of
variation and contrary movements. Still, the results show that
the import liberalization episodes from 1986 to 1988 reduced the
disparities in EPRs across sectors. Although not insignificant,
the impact however was not large enough to substantially alter
the inherent biases of the protection structure.
These findings should throw some light on the recent debate
between the Department of Trade and Industry and the Department
of Agriculture regarding the policy bias against the agricultural
sector. It is clear from the estimates that, on average, such a
bias exists. Specifically, in 1988, the (i + EPR) index (using
price comparison) for manufacturing is estimated to be 135.1,
with agriculture set to 1@0. This means that, on average,
protection to manufacturing (derived from tariff and import
controls) is roughly 35 percent higher than that for agriculture.
These are average figures, however, hiding a lot of variation.
Hence, it would not be entirely correct to conclude that all of
manufac£_ring is favored. Many sectors even within
manufacturing, notably export sectors, are penalized. Or
conversely, only certain sectors within manufacturing are favored
by trade (and industrial) policy.
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C. Implications of Some Proposed Policy Changes
Trade liberalization, thus far, remains to be the stated
policy direction under the Aquino Administration. Debates
abounded regarding its merits, its timing, its sequencing and
phasing. Conflicting views emerged not only between the business
sector and the government, but also within the business and
government sectors themselves. Some compromises were made.
First and foremost, the scheduled import liberalization was
delayed. Second, the sequencing of commodities to be liberalized
tended to favor some sectors over others. Third, tariffs were
adjusted to replace removed quantitative restrictions to some
extent. Fourth, some tariffs on inputs were reduced. Still,
although perhaps not by as much as what the number indicated,
trade liberalization proceeded.
This section a i_s to examine some proposed policies, adopted
Or otherwise, which could be suggestive of the likely policy
direction the government would take. The process of trade
liberalization is by no means complete. And whatever headway
which might have been achieved has been hard-won. It would be
extremely detrimental if a policy reversal would occur now, when
the country has paid for much of the costs but not as yet
received even half of the gains from trade liberalization. It is
thus important to see which direction the government is likely-to
take_
Proposed policy changes in the area of trade could generally
be grouped as follows:
a.: the reduction of the minimum tariff rate from 10 percent
to five percent or even zero for "extremely meritorious" cases;
b. raising the maximum rate above 50 percent;
c. those contained in the IMF letter of intent; and
d. Senate Bill No. 846 introduced by Senator Guingona
restoring import restrictions and imposing 6_ percent tariffs on
liberalized items.
The first has been adopted although it has not yet been
generally implemented. The Tariff Commission has already been
deluged with applications for reducing tariffs so that the
situation increasingly calls for a review of what really is the
tariff policy of government. Clearly the move to reduce minimum
tariffs without corresponding reduction in high tariffs goes
against the stated general direction of moving towards a more
uniform rate. It would generally increase the EPR dispersion.
And it would increase inducements for import-dependent import
substituting industries. Already, those industries using inputs
taxed at low duties • (i.e., duties below the degree of under-
valuation of foreign exchange) receives an implicit subsidy and
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would naturally prefer imported inputs over local substitutes.
Further reducing the minimum rate increases this subsidy and
aggravates the bias against local intermediate input SubStitute.
Furthermore, reducing the minimum rate means less revenues which,
given a cash strapped government, implies a need to raise taxes
elsewhere.
The development in the second item, raising the maximum rate
above 50 percent, is not yet in the same stage as the first.
There are clamors from certain industry groups for increasing the
maximum tariff rate. An element in the Guingona Bill seeks a 60
percent tariff on liberalized items. Still, proposals have
fortunately been, so far, nipped in the bud.
Perhaps the most significant, as it carries greatest weight
in terms of actually being implemented, is the part on trade
policy contained in the IMF letter of intent_ The IMF letter of
intent upholds the policy direction of greater trade
liberalization but delays the schedule up to 1994. There are
currently 579 items still subject to trade control. These have
been grouped according to List A or items scheduled to be
liberalized, List B or items for review and List C or items for
continued regulation (See Table ii). The IMF letter of
intent specified the number of items to be liberalized by certain
dates.
The delay in itself should not cause _oo much concern --- if
investors perceive a firm commitment on the part of government to
see through the reforms. A more disturbing item in the IMF
letter of intent, however, is the clause which requires importers
to submit to the Department of Trade and Industry "at the same
time those import documents that normally have to be submitted to
the Central Bank before letters of credit can be opened,
indicating the item, value..." and other information, ostensibly
to improve the data base and strengthen efforts against
smuggling. It is easy to see how, potentially, such procedure
could be used to erect non-tariff barriers. It remains to be
seen how the Department would administer this power.
The Senate Bill No. 846 authored by Senator Guingona which
seeks to restore all import restrictions and impose 60 percent
tariffs on liberalized items, if passed, would be a clear
negation of present policy, The probability that the Bill would
eventually be passed seems low. Still, such a bill is indicative
of the policy bias in the Senate.
Given the unavoidable adjustment costs attendant to trade
liberalization, it has understandably been a controversial and
difficult process. It is, however, unfortunate that some
sectors, even of government (and perhaps especially so because of
these sectors in government), simply view trade liberalization as
merely an imposition of IMF. This non-issue has contributed
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greatly, to clouding the real issues and weaken the ,resolve of
government to implement this reform.
: The major gains from trade liberalization are dynamic in
nature _and long-run, in coming. Adj._stment costs; the
displacements, would come first. Eor trade liberalization to _
succeed, it-cannot ,be •overemphasized that a firm commitment to
the reform is necessary on the_part of_government. : :
III. THE ROLE OF EXCHANGE RATE POLICY
• Given -ihe _external debt situation,, the .Philippine:s:'i best •
recourse is ,to_pursue an export-ledt economi_c growth. Otherwise,
growth, would eventual!_'be _ constrained .by balance-of-payments
difficulties..! This placeS_a central roles'on the excha:nge'_r_ate
policy in industrial development. '_ _ '
The exchange .rate•.• policy in the-past .has been • ,one of
penalty, not pr.otection, to the export sector. 6_/ It. added • to
the penalty already received by. exports , from the protect.ion
system by fixing the rate at unrealistically low levels. In _ the
1950s, and the 196@s',, this was made possible by import controls
and high tariffs, at least until BOP difficulties forced a!
devaluation. Beginning in the early 1970s, the exchange rate was
supposedly allowed to float b_t it was still effectively, managed
by the Central:Bank. Foreign borrowing,, which started to grow-in
the 1970s, and tQ burgeon in the 1980s, propped ,up the- peso,
hi di:ng_ an •underlying BOP dis•equilibrium. When the 1983-84 BOP
crisis erupted, the peso., again,• had. to be devalued drastically.
The Philippines, thus, has a history of trying to maintain a
fixed exchange rate ,until extreme BOP ,difficulties made it
impossible to do-so. : - : ,' " ,
• . ,'[ , =, . . , ,
With unrealis, tically low (real•) exchange rate, export's 'wer-e
effectively penali:zed, as_their returns were reduced by•the lower
peso per unit of foreign exchange, Nontradables, on tLe other
hand,, were rewa,rded. These are goods or:-servlces which can
neither be exported .nor ,imported _ '-- nat_rally .•(because of'
prohibitive transport costs) or " artificia-lly (because of
government policy manifested through an import prohibition).
Mo,st especially rewarded_are nontradables,dependent on imports
for their inputs. For-these goods, 'the low. exchange rate has no
penalty On the_output price (as they are nontraded)' while their
imported i_nputscome in at effectively lower prices. To this
group would belong many commodities protected by import bans.
•:_ • 6/ ;•• •••_•-'_ _•• •_::-,• •i• -••• - •= •• ••''•••
• _ It also penalized iefficient but neglected import
substitutes (those which rece_ved:lowleffect_ive prO tection,)l",
+
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If one would rank commodity groups from most rewarded to
most penalized by a low exchange rate, at the head of the list
would be the import-dependent "nontradables." Next would be
local production of high tariff (high EPR) items and those that
are importable but subject to import control. In "the middle
would be "true" nontradables. The next group would be composed
of neglected import substitutes (e.g., some intermediate and
capital goods) where imports are allowed at low duties. The most
Renalized are exports (to this would belong agriculture which is
a net exporter).
The Philippines tried to maintain a fixed nominal exchange
rate for periods of time, until it was forced to devalue. With
higher domestic inflation relative to the world, this meant a
real appreciation of the peso. TaDle 12 presents the Real and
Nominal Effective exchange rate 7_/ indices from 1972 to 1988 (and
January, February 1989 estimates).
Table 12 shows the real effective exchange rate index
(REERI) falling until 1982, indicating a real appreciation of the
peso. With the huge devaluation in 1983-84, it rose to an index
above 100 but fell again in 1985 with inflation rates that
reached as high as 50 percent. The REERI rose again from 1986 to
1988.
It is interesting to note how these changes in the REERI
affected exports. In Figure i, the movement of the changes in
REERI is plotted in the upper graph while the movement in the
changes in exports is plotted in the lower graph. The graphs
show an almost synchronized movement between REERI and exports.
Going back to Table 12, there seems to be a positive
movement in the REERI from 1986-1988. This apparent depreciation
of the peso, however, was brought about by world currency
realignment -- with the US dollar, during the period,
depreciating against the major world currencies. Being almost
pegged to the US dollar, the peso depreciated along with it.
However, in 1989, especially the latter months, the US dollar is
again gaining strength, and, indeed, there appears to be a
downward trend in REERI in January and February 1989.
The more revealing indicator of the competitiveness of the
peso would, however, be how the peso fared with the currencies of
our major competitors, specifically, Thailand, Taiwan, S. Korea,
Singapore and Hongkong. This is shown by the movement in the
The nomina_ effective exchange rate index is a trade
weighted average of the peso-exchange rate index of major trading
partners. The real effective exchange rate index adds to changes
in the nominal effective exchange rate index the domestic
inflation net of inflation rate of respective trading partners.
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Table 12: NOMINAL AND REAL EFFECTIVE
EXCHANGE RATE INDEX (1972-1988)
Year Nominal Effective Real Effective
Exchange Rata Index Exchange Rate Index
(%) (%)
1972 100.00 100.00
1973 108.89 105.01
1974 107.67 87.88
1975 114.71 96.79
1976 115.78 100.43
1977 119.00 102.94
1978 130.01 110.60
1979 130.03 98.41
1980 131.52 92.51
1981 133.91 90.21
1982 136.18 87.30
1983 174.27 107.49
1984 254.57 105.04
1985 276.93 92.80
1986 348.12 117.64
1987 373.49 124.76
1988 406.36 128.67
1989
Jan. 354.32 126.14
Feb. 353..39 125.99
- 15-year average.
Sources:
International Financial Statistics, IMFo
Key Indicators of DMCs, ADBo
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real exchange rate index between the peso and the currencies of
these countries as presented in Table 13.
Table 13 shows the peso/won real exchange rate index rising
in 1983-84 but falling again in 1985-1986. Hence, the peso
became relatively cheaper in 1983-84 only to lose some competi-
tiveness again against the Korean won in 1985-1986. The index
started to rise again after 1986 until 1988. The early months of
1989, again however seems to indicate a downward trend. The
peso/HK$ real exchange rate index has fallen from the 1973 index
but at least has been maintained in the past three years. The
peso/baht real exchange rate was falling from 1972 to 1982, but
the index rose in 1983-84. Then it started falling again, conti-
nuously until 1989. Thailand appears to have used the exchange
rate more aggressively. Taiwan, on the other hand, with its
long-running BOP surplus, has been under pressure to revalue its
currency. Thus, the peso/Taiwan dollar real exchange rate index
has risen substantially since 1973. The movement of the peso
aqainst the Singapore dollar is similar to that as the peso/won
index.
Hence, in general, the peso has recently become more compe-
titive against the won, the Singapore dollar and Taiwan dollar.
But it has lost competitiveness against the baht and Hongkong
dollar.
The Philippine exchange rate policy has, thus, not changed
much. After a series of de facto devaluations in 1983-84, it has
moved closely with the US dollar. The Philippines has not used
the exchange as aggressively as Thailand, for example. A more
aggressive exchange rate policy could have worked very well as a
complementary measure to accompany import liberalization.
IV. THE 1987 OMNIBUS INVESTMENT CODE
One of the priority acts of the Aquino Government was the
passing of the 1987 Omnibus Investment Code (1987 OIC), intended
primarily to a_tract new investment, foreign or local,
particularly in pioneering industries. This section aims to
assess the provisions of the Code with respect to its effectivity
as a tool for industrial development and its consistency with
other national objectives.
A cursory examination of the OIC suggests an attempt on the
part of the government to replicate Japan's highly successful bid
for industrialization after the war. Japan's strategy for
industrial development during the postwar era included, among
others, the following elements:
a. a relentless export promotion drive,
b. import and foreign investment controls,
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Table13: NOMINALEXCHANGERATEANDREALE%CHAND(RATEINDEX:
PHILIPPINESvs. KOREA,SINDAPORE_THAILAND_TA]HM,6 HOHGKON6
1972-19691
YEAR Korea Singapore Thailand Tad.an HongKon9
......................................................................................
Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real
i%} (%) (Z) (Z) (%)
.................................................................. _ ......................................
1972 D.91&990 lEg.gO 2.3747 1dO.DO 0.3267 lg.d g,1666 1g.Dg 1.1686 160.88
1973 D.D[7DOD 88,95 2,7649 129.95 6.3277 193,61 9.1766 188,g3 1.3116 118,46
1974. 6.916888 88,26 2.7855 115.28 0.3T32 95.89 8.1786 115.34 1.3378 94.96
1975 6.915868 95.28 3.9565 126.11 g.3557 99.45 8.1907 119.64 1.4675 98,84
1976 6.915409 95.41 3.9113 106.62 g,3647 188,22 6.1958 119.55 1.5171 99.6_
1977 8.915389 96.87 3.9347 1D4.36 8.3629 99.21 B.1946 116.95 1,5879 102.03
1978 6.61521? 183.95 3.2391 ID8.44 0.3622 ??.41 D.1986 117.25 1.5722 99.39
1979 8.815243 162.64 3.3?29 97,56 0.361T 98.27 03947 110.11 1.4747 86.18
1986 8.612_5 94,63 3.5878 91.38 9,3669 93.05 9.2896 113,69 1.5994 85.81
1981 9.g11600 95.93 3.7393 93.93 0.3621 91.48 6.2144 11%85 1.4125 61.19
1982 8.611691 93.66 3.9907 ?3.34 8.3713 96,93 8.2193 113.45 1.4665 78.30
1983 9.914276 196,36 5.2591 114.61 9.4932 111.14 9.2774 134,_8 1.5286 84.90
1984 6.02671? 165.28 7.8295 lib,g6 6.7064 167.27 9.4217 136.47 2,13&8 82.96
1985 8,821387 86,91 9.4576 99.69 g.6951 82,72 6.4669 119,37 2.8836 9S.3_
1966 8,82_128 95.29 9.3721 167.72 6.779_ 94.92 8._466 137.93 2.6136 88,44
1987 g.0251Bg 163.15 9.7769 _68.79 D,8gB? 96.36 9,651! i61.86 2.6694 91.67
1986 0,828989 117.44 18.4904 199.92 D.9342 94.26 9.7461 171.84 2.7620 _.63
Dec. 9.631266 125.19 18.9938 116.54 8.9497 92.74 9.7599 19%09 ....
1989 6,631660 126,99 11.8247 186.43 0.8428 91.82 6.7835 [72.89 2.7413 94,51
Jan, 8.D_1688 123.26 11,8788 186,13 9,6452 88,11 0,7767 195,73 2,7372 --
Feb. 6,831869 124,27 11.88_2 ID5.19 6.8412 68.47 8.7781 197.91 2.7358 --
i Preliminaryeetilate only (Jan.-Feb. 1989)
-- HenthlysiaL/sties not available
baseyear - 1972
Source;International Financial Statistics (IFS)
KeyIndicaLersof 8HCsof AOD
DER_Central Dankof the Philippines
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c. focus on heavy industries like petrochemicals and steel,
d. reliance on subcontracting,
e. cartelization designe__ to harness economies of scale,
and
f. _undervaluation of t_e yen.
A very powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) was tas_ed accordingl_ to provide "administrative
guidance" to industry. The MITI _eld close consultation with the
business associations and decisions were often made through
painstaking efforts at building consensus.
There are traces, in varying degrees, of these elements in
the OIC which basically embodies the strategy for industrial
development adopted by the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI). For example,/ with regards to the first element,
investment incentives,_irst started to De institutionalized in
1970 with the enactment of the Export Incentives ACt (RA 6135).
Since then, the Incentives Act has been amended and codified
three times over, culminating in the Executive Order 226 (EO 226)
or the 1987 Omnibus Investment Code. EO 226 superseded Betas
Pambansa 391 (BP 391), passed in 1983, which introduced radical
changes in the form of incentives. During all these times, the
emphasis on exports waned, then waxed, :then waned again.
Nevertheless, although the export promotion drive could not
seriously compare with that of Japan, there has always been
attention given to exports by the government since 1970.
With respect to the second element, tariffs and import
Controls have been used since the 195_s ro protect and promote
_ndustries. _Even now, with programs for trade liberalization,
they continue to be a major tool for industrial promotion. In
particular, @ii outputs covered by the DTI's progressive
manufacturing programs are subject to import bans. The DTI also
has influence over where foreign investment ShOUld go and how
mgcn foreign equity participation could be allowed.
.... In the early 1980s, there were plans _or ii major industrial
projects. Fortunately for the Philippines, only one pushed
through. The DTI has ongoing progressive manufacturing programs
intended to be a_inkage to, and a first step towards heavy
industries. Also, through its Investment Priorities Plan (IPP)
listing of industries eligible for incentives, it exercises a
choice of what it considers strategic industries.
Expansion of subcontracting activity is among the goals of
the DTI. The Bureau of Small and Medium Scale Ind_stry has
programs targetted on this. There has been little success in
this area, however. The OIC is particularly silent as t_Q__how it
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would be promoted. It is not even apparent whether some
provisions of the OIC would not be biased against it.
Penultimately, the fifth element listed is presumably the
rationale for adopting the measured capacity concept.
Clearly, however, the strategy which worked well with Japan
was not effective for the Philippines. Numerous reasons could be
found for this failure. One is that although Japan imposed
strict import controls, all the other incentives were geared
towards export promotion. This more than made up for the export
penalty from protectionist policies, resulting in an export
promotion bias rather than on import substitution bias which the
Philippines, on the other hand, has had since the 1950s. Also,
while Japan kept the yen undervalued, (item f) the Philippines,
in contrast, has protected its domestic currency.
Many other elements and institutional factors, of course,
contributed to Japan's success. Perhaps one of the most
important, which probably made these elements_ institutions and
mechanisms work so well for Japan, is the strong sense of
national interest on the part of the Japanese elite, and thereby
its commitment to national development. At the same time,
Japan's labor force is well known for its dedication and loyalty
to the establishment.
Thus, perhaps, the root cause of the difference in
performance lies in the presence of these other elements in Japan
which the Philippines sorely lacked. These are factors which
prevented the abuse of such power and role played by government.
These are factors which complemented well the market forces in
revealing Japan's real comparative advantage.
What the lessons from the past indicate is that it is best
for the Philippines to place greater reliance on market forces.
That the role of the government is to remove distortions which
prevent the market from working efficiently.
Thus, the 1987 OIC (EO 229) should be examined and analyzed
by how it influences market signals, thereby providing "guidance"
to investors to allocate resources efficiently.
The changes in the investment incentives introduced under BP
391 in 1983 were sweeping and innovative. As a starting point in
evaluating the EO 226, it is very instructive to compare EO 226
with BP 391. This is done very concisely in Manasan (1989).
Manasan (1989) made a comparison of the incentives granted
under BP 391 and EO 226. Her findings are summarized and
presented in Table 14. EO 226 replaces the provisions on tax
credit on net value earned and net local content by the income
tax holiday for a duration ranging from three to eight years.
Also, EO 226 allows both exporting and non-exporting firms duty
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Table14: COMPARISONOFINCENTIVESUND[RBP_Yl ANSEO226
SP_91 EO226
Incentive Oomestic Export Oomestic Export
Producer Producer Producer Producer
Pioneer Non-Pioneer Pioneer Non-Pioneer Pioneer Non-PioneerPioneer Nun-Pioneer
.............................................................................................................................
I.Exemptionfromduties IB_Z IOBZ IBBZ lIflZ IBBZ IBBZ
•and taxes on imported
capital equipment
2. Oefer_entof duties 100l 5_l NtA N/A N/A N/A N/A N/_
andtaxeson imported
capitalequipment,o
be repaid within 5 years
3. Taxcredit on doaestic 1@OZ lm81 1891 180% 1001 18B_
capital equipment
equivalent to duties
andtaxeson similar
foreign equipment
4. Taxcredit on domestic IBBI 1BmZ N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
capitalequipaentto
be repaid within 5 years
5, Taxcredit onnet value IOZ 5Z 1Bl _% N/A N/A NIA N/A
• earnedfor five years
6, Ta_credit onnet 1B_ 1B_ NiA NIA N/A N/A
localcontentfor
five years
a/ al a/ a/
7, Taxholiday N/_ N/A N/A MIA 6_Syears 4-7 years 6-8 years 4-7 years
8, Net operating Yes Yes Yes Yea No No No No
loss carry over
b/ b/ b/ b/
9. Seductionfroi No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
taxable incomeof 5_2
of incrementallabor
eapensefor 5 years
a/
Theseare applicable to hemproject_, Expandingfirms are entitled to threeyear
tax holiday, Existing firms are out entitled to the tax holiday at _ll,
bt
Redundantfor fires enjoyingtax holiday,
Source: Table in Hanasan(1989).
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free importation of capital equipment. This incentive was granted
only to exporting firms under BP 391. 8/ Manasan thus notes that
BP 391 provided more beneffts to exporters than to non-exporters
while the incentives under EO 226 are perfectly neutral with
respect to these two groups of producers.
Manasan (1989) also estimated the impact on the internal
rate of return (IRR) of the more important provisions of BP 391
and EO 226 on hypothetical BOI registered firms. Her results
are reproduced in Tables 15 and 16. Table 15 shows that the
increment on the IRR of exporters is three to four times as large
as that of non-exporters under BP 391 while Table 16 indicates
that EO 226 differentiates between pioneer and non-pioneer
enterprises only. Consequently, the inducements given to
exporters are reduced by half while the benefits made available
to non-exporters almost doubled under the new Investment
Incentives Code.
//
BOI incentives can be justified as a means to provide
compensating adjustments to counteract the bias against exports
of the prevailing trade regime. 9/ The anti-export bias arising
from the protection structure could be compensated on two levels:
(1) giving export producers access to imports and world
market prices, and
(2) evening protection between exporters and domestic
market producers by granting exporters the same level of
protection (measured, for example, by EPR) accorded to domestic
market producers (import substituting industry).
The first adjustment is provided for by both BP 391 and EO
226. _ These are still inadequate, however, since indirect
exporters are not reached. BP 391 makes a partial adjustment in
_/
Under BP 391, pioneer non-exporting firms can only defer
payment of all duties and taxes on capital equipment for a period
of five years. Non-pioneer non-exporting firms may defer only up
to 50 percent of these taxes for a period of five years.
Others prefer to view BOI incentives as protection to
infant industries. While a case may be made for assisting infant
industries, the implementation starting from selecting which
"infants" to promote, is administratively difficult. This arises
mainly from the extreme difficulty in predicting which "infants"
have potential comparative advantage and government intervention
could only very likely introduce more distortions. Ideally,
then, if the government is to grant incentives under the infant
industry case, it should choose very judiciously only a limited
number of industries at a time using the most neutral (non-
distorting) policy measures.
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Table15: CHAN6E]N THEINTERNALRATEOFRETURNOFHYPOTHETICAL
RO[REGISTEREOFIRNRUNOERRP391 a/
[In PercentagePoints)
Exporting Non-Exportin9
NonPioneer Pioneer NonPioneer Pioneer
n=18 n=28 n=18 n=28 n=10 n=2m n=18 n=28
..............................................................................................
1. ExelpLion/ 3.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 ,5 .25 1.8 .5
Deferment
of duties
oncapita] b/
2. TaxCredit 2.25 .5 3.5 1.75 2,25 .5 _.5 1.75
onnet
valueearned
T, TaxCredit ?.8 4.75 9,8 4,75
onnet local
content
4. Total 15,75 835 17.8 1B.0 3,75 1.75 5.5 3.25
a/
ChanRein [RRis colputedrelative to IRRo: 10l
b/
Coeputedbasedon t : .2 andVAT_here t is tariff on capita] equipgent.
k k
Source: Table in ffanasan(1989).
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Table 16: CHANGE IN THE INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN
OF HYPOTHETICAL BOI REGISTERED FIRMS
UNDER EO 226 a/
(In Percentage Points)
Non Pioneer Pioneer
n=10 n=20 n=10 n=20
i. Tax holiday 2.5 1.75 3.5 2.5
without extension
2. Tax holiday 3.75 2.75 4.0 3.0 •
with maximum
extension
3o Duty Exemption 3.5 2.5 3.5 2.5
on Capital b/
4. i+3 7.25 4.9 8.25 5.75
5. 2+3 8.75 6.0 9.0 6.5
a/
Change in IRR is computed relative to IRRo = 10%.
b/
Computed based on t = .2 and VAT where t is tariff
k k
on capital equipment.
Source: Table in Manasan (1989).
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this regard by including a proportion of local content as tax
credit for exporters. EO 226, on the other hand, has no
mechanism at all to reach indirect exporters.
The tax credit on net value earned granted under BP 391
partially provides compensation for anti-export bias under (2)
above. • 10/ This •incentive has been • replaced by the income tax
holiday under EO 226. Comparing line 2 in Table 15 and line i in
Table 16 suggests that the two provisions (tax credit•on net
value earned under BP 391 and income tax holiday under EO 226)
provide roughly the same benefits to exporters in terms of their
impact on the IRR. Manasan (1989) notes, howeverp that the
estimate for the impact of an income tax holiday (TaDle 16) is
likely to be overstated, mainly since the analysis assumes that
the registered•firm is uniformly profitable over its life • span.
It is most likely that the firm would actually De incurring
losses in the earlier years which coincide with the period when
the tax holiday is available.
To summarize, the EO 226 is inferior to BP 391 (inadequate
though it waS) in providing compensation for the anti-export • bias
of the protection system.
On the "measured capacity" concept, much has been said about
its negative impact. Stills it is a feature of all investment
incentives including EO 226 except BP 391. Regulating entry
implies some limitation or competition and could penalize
potential exporters.
With regards to some concern about the competitiveness of
BOI incentives with those offered by other countries, Manasan
(1988) compared the investment incentives granted by the ASEAN
countries and concluded that the ASEAN countries are equally
competitive with each other before as after incentives (See Table
17). The comparison made use of EO 226 incentives. Hence, we can
infer t•hat BP 391 incentives have been more generous than those
of other ASEAN countries with respect to export producers. Thus,
shifting to EO 226 might have in effect reduced the
attractiveness of the Philippines to footloose export industries.
The impact of the 1987 OIC could also be deduced from
selected statistics on BOI approved projects from 1981 to 1988
under the successive versions of the Investment InCentives Act --
P.D. 1789, amended by BP 391 in 1983, then superseded by EO 226
(or 1987 OIC) in 1987.
10__/
The compensation is partial since a tax credit of only 10
percent of net value earned is granted while estimates of EPR for
importables have been shown to be much higher.
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Table 17: INTERNALRATEOFRETURNOFA HYPOTHETICALFIRM
UNOERSELECTEDINCENTIVESCHEMESIN ASEANCOUNTRIES
1988a/
Indonesiab/ Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
n=_e n=2g n=lg n=2g n=lg n=2B n=lg n=2g n=lg n=2g
1. RegelarTaxes 11,B 13.9 19.25 11.5 15.g 16.5 11.25 13.25
(no incenkive) :_.g 12.5 Ig.25 II.I
9.9 12,0
2. TaxHoliday NA 16.3 15,g 12.5 13.5 17.B 17.25 12.g 13.5
(min. no. of 19.0 19,75
years ailQNed)
3. Tax Holiday N_ 16.75 17.g 1#.1 15.9 29.9 19,0 14.9 15.g
(max,no, of 2g.g I%75
yearssllo_ed)
4, DutyExemption15.0 16.5 12.25 12.25 13,75 14.g NA 15.0 16.5
no Capital 14,25 15.75
13.5 I5,25
5. (2 + 4_ 15 16,5 19.35 17.35 17.5 17.8 17.9 17.25 16,5 17,$
14.25 15.75 19.0 18,7_
13,5 15.25
6. (_ + 4) 15 16.5 29.9 19.25 19.25 18,4 28_8 1%9 19.9 18.5
14,25 15.75 26.6 1%75
13.5 15,25
7, Investaent HA 16.g 15.1 HA 18,8 19.25 NA
Allowance
Only
(max. allowed)
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continuationof T_ble17 ....
Indonesiab/ Ra[ays£_ PhiZippine5 Singapere Thailand
n=lm n=20 n=10 0=28 n=lD n=20 n=10 n=20 n=IB n=20
_, (7 _ 4) 17,7 17,D NA 10,6 18,25 NA
9. Expert 16,5 lb.6 1i,5 13.5
Allowance
DnlycJ
18, (2 + 4 + 9) HA 2_,9 1%5 N_ 17,0 17,5
11, (_ _ 4 + ?] NA .26,0 2_,9 NA ig,_ 17,8
HeeOiLeme_
tm .25 .12 ,2 0 .2
a/
Theassumedintone streae usedin thesecalculations is thaL ,hich yields before tax I_R of .20
b/
for u : _5_25, 35%, r_spectiveIy
cl
for 100Zexport.
Source: Manas_n(1986),
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Table 18a provides a summary of selected statistics for the
years 1981-1988 on new and expansion projects approved under P.D.
1789, in 1983 as amended by BP 391, and EO 226 from 1987-1988.
The figures are very revealing. The total number of firms
changed with the state of the economy -- falling in 1984 with the
economic recession, and in 1986 at the height of political
uncertainty and then leaping in 1987 and 1988 with economic
recovery and regained confidence in the government. Most
revealing and interesting, however, are the figures for capital-
labor ratio (K/L) _ which is estimated by project cost divided by
employment, and ave[age cost per firm, which could indicate size.
The K/L ratio fell drastically during the period 1983 to 1986
when BP 391 was effective from _512,740 per employee in 1982 to
_83,660 in 1986. Then the ratio started to rise again in 1987
with EO 226, more than doubling in 1988 to _224,290 per employee.
Deflating by the GNP deflator, which is done in Table 18b, did
not alter the results. The same pattern holds. A similar trend
could also be discerned for average cost per firm.
The large differences clearly indicate the capital bias of
investment incentive system prior to 1983, which to some extent
(though not fully) seems to be replaced in 1987 with the EO 226.
Or conversely, the much lower K/L ratio for the years under BP
391 verifies its neutrality with respect to factor prices.
Tables 19a and 19b present the same statistics, disaggre-
gated by type of producers ~- agricultural, domestic, export and
other producers. The differences in K/L ratio are less
significant for export producers, especially using constant
prices° This could imply that exports responded more to the
country's comparative advantage in labor. Except for 1984, the
K/L ratio for domestic producers was much higher° This again
confirms exports to be more labor-intensive.
In sum then, the incentive provided under BP 391 is superior
to those of E0 226 in terms of its promotion of labor-intensive
and export industries. An analysis of how the incentives
affected hypothetical firms bears this conclusion. And
statistics seem to confirm it as well.
V. EXPORT PROMOTION SCHEMES
As could De gleaned from the previous section, the 0IC is
one of the major instruments for granting incentives to exports.
Aside from the BOI export incentives provided under the OIC,
there are a number of other schemes which are primarily aimed at
providing "free-trade" status to exports by granting exporters
access to intermediate inputs at world market prices.
TO ensure that e_porters are competitive with their foreign
counterparts as far as intermediate input cost is concerned, the
government administers tax and duty exemption as well as tax and
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Table 18a: SELECTED STATISTiCSON NEW AND_EXPANSION PROJECTS
.APPROVED UNDER P.D. 1789 (WITH INCENTIVES)
(In Thousand Pesos)
(1981-1988)
........................................................... --. T .....
_EAR No.: of Project Cost Employment K/L : Average/Cost
. firms (Nominal) _ / .per firm
(1) - ' (2) (3) . 2)/(3) (2)/(1)
1981 193' . ii,364,-366 53,110 _ 213.98 58,882._3
i_82. 143: 14,497,342 28_274 512_74 101,380.01
1983 _:' 143.:_ 7_43_,@44 27,980 265_80 52,007.30
1984 121. 7,203,588 37,830 190.42 59,533.7.9
1985 _ 136 2,742,089 23,961 i14._44 20,162_4_21
1986 114 2,191,961 26,201 83.66 19,227'73;
1987
P.D. 17819 230 5,369,942 48,782 I10.08 23,347_57 .
E.O. 226' 181 4,474,199 33,319 134.28 24,719.33 ::i
1988 * 616 28,720,161 128,052 224.29 46,623.64_' _
* E.O. 226 ,:_.:
. ..... • .... ,. ..
Source: Department of Trade and Industry
._" . .... , _" ...- ..'....... '-:;.. :....,-.
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Table 18b: SELECTED STATISTICS ON NEW AND EXPANSION PROJECTS
APPROVED ONDER P.D. 1789 (WITH INCENTIVES)
(In Thousand Pesos)
(1981-1988)
YEAR No. of Pro3ect Cost a/ Employment K/L Average Cost
firms (Real) per firm
(1) [2) (3) (2)/(3) (2)/(1)
1981 193 11,364,366 53,110 213.98 58,882.73
1982 143 13,371,779 28,274 472.94 93,508.94
1983 143 6,142,534 27,980 219.53 42,954.78
1984 121 3,970,818 37,830 104.96 32,816.68
1985 136 1,278,566 23,961 53.36 9,401.22
1986 114 1,005,223 26,201 38.37 8,817.75
1987
P.D. 178.9 230 2,283,490 48,782 46.81 9,928.22
E.O. 226 181 1,902,588 33,319 57.10 10,511.54
1988 * 616 11,187,537 i28,052 87.37 18,161.59
* E.O. 226
a/ Deflated by GNP deflator (1981=100)
Source: Department of Trade and Industry
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Table 19a: SELECTEDSTRTISTICSONNEUANDEXPANSIONPROJECTS
(NITHINCENTIVES)APPROVEOUNDERP.D. 1789
( In ThousandPesos)
(1981-1988)
1981 1982 l_D3 198_ 1985 1966 1987 1988I
P.O. 1789 E.O. 226
............................................................................... -_ .........................................
NO.OFFIRMS 193 143 143 I21 136 114 23D 181 616
_oricultura| Producers 4D 15 18 13 12 16 24 23
OouesLicProducers 34 23 _ 19 B 5 9 6 77
ExportProducers 118 185 93 89 116 q5 i97 152 5_9
Others 1
PROJECTCOSTsl 11,364,366L4_497,3427_437_[447,,2D3_882_742_DDR2,_91,9615_9,9q2 4,474p19928,72D,161
AGricultural Producer_ 2,6_B,2_ 627_282 _76_O46 783_188 486,Bg7 422_576 627,568 826_899
Ooiestic Producers 3,533+599 11+g72_6545,DS8,65_ i_B37_886 286,3D5 199,91_ _1905B2 366,56212,346,828
ExportProducers 5,158,537 2,797,486 1,872,_45 5_462,514 2,g48_977 1,569,469 4_322,8gg _,281_538[6,_74,141
Others 3g,gOg
8NPOeflator IDg.g_D I88.417 121.87_ I81.413 214.466 218.857 235,164 235.164 25_,'716
EMPLOYMENT 53,118 28,274 27,98g 37,831 23,%1 26,2_I 48,782 33,_19 128,852
_gricultural Producers 1g_b_g 3,285 2_7Z8 2_571 3_455 2_129 5,169 2_437
Dolestic Producers q,353 6,21g b_587 9,787 226 237 2,7D4 1,_Dl 22,g45
ExportProducers 32_989 18_779 18,745 25_472 ..2g,2SB 23_635 42,9_? 29,581 186,_7
Others 118
K/L 214 513 266 19_ 114 O4 118 134 224
AgriculturalProducers 2_9 191 175 27_ 141 198 198 _39
DomesticProducers 37D 1,783 782 iS6 913 8_4 155 282 568
ExportProducer_ -156 149 i_ 214 I_l _6 IgI IlI 15_
Others 254
_9ERA6ECOSTPER.FIRM •5OpDB3 ID1,388 32,D87 59,534 28,162 19,22_ 2_¢_ 2_,719 46,b24
floricultural Producers -66,256 _1,819 26_47 . 54,D91 48,#67 26,411 26_48 35_917
DomesticProducers 1g3,929 481_428 iSO,g2g 54_62_ 25_788 39,983. 46,628 61,894 16D,338
Exp_rt Producers 43_649 26,642 2D,133 61,_77 17,664 16,876 21_9_3 2[,589 _g,37_
Others 38,U8
t E,O. 22_
a/ Nominal
Source: Departmentof TradeandIndustry
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Tabb,196 SELECTED'STATISTICSONNEWANDEXPANSIONPROJECTS
•(WITHINCENTIVES)APPROVEDUNDERP.O.1789
: In ThousandPesos
: (1981-1988)
19B[ '1982. 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 198B!
P.D. 1789 E.O. 226
NO.OFFIRMS 193 143 143 121 136 114 238 181 616
Agricultural Producers 4D 15 18 13 12 16 24 23
DomesticProducerg 34 23 32 19 O 5 9 b 77
Export Producers 11R 195 q3 89 116 93 197 IS2 539
Others i
PRO#ECTCOSTb/ 11,364,366 13,371,839 6,142_518 3,971,822 1_278t5661,085,224 2,283,488 1,9g2,58711,187,523
Agricultural Producers2,658,231 578,583 393,i83 _97j617 226_98& 193_792 266,861 351,286 g
DomesticProducers 3_533_V9 IB,213,824 4,202F893 572,112 96j195 71,681 178_421 155,875 4,Bg9_213
ExportProducers 5,158,537 2_$8g,228 1,546,4_4 3,011,_93 955,385 719,752 1_838,2g7 1,395,423 6_378p_g9
Other_ 3B,Dgg g B _ g g 8 g B
ERPLOYNENT 53,11D 28,274 27,78g 37jB3g 23,961 26_281 4D,782 33,319 12B,852
ARricultura] Producers 1g,65g 3,2B5 2_728 2j571 3j455 2,129 3,IG9 2_#37
DomesticProducers 9,333 6,218 6,567 9,787 226 237 2,7g4 1,361 22,D45
ExportProducers 32,989 18,779 18_745 25,472 28,298 23,835 42,9_9 29,581 186,887
Others 118
ElL 213.98 472.94 219.53 184.96 53.36 38.37 46.S1 57.18 87.37
figricultural Producers 248,B_ 176.13 144.13 1_8.77 65,78 91.W2 84.21 144.15
DomesticProducers 377.8g 1644.61 645.9g 58.46 425.64 3B6.84 65.98 119.81 218.15
ExportProducers 156.13 137.48 82,58 118.21 47.11 38.2g 42.94 47.17 68.17
Others 254.24
AVERnSECOSTPERFIRM 58pOD2.73 93,589.33 42,934.62 32,916.71 9,481.22 8,817.75 V_928.21 18,511._3 18_161;56
_griculturaI Producers 66,255.75 38,572.18 21,843.49 29,816.71 19,g15,4/12_111,97 11,119.17 15,273.32
DomesticProducers 183,929.38 444,844.51131,348.41 38,111.17 12,824.34 18,336.12 19,924.56 2_,9_° _ _ _ "_
ExportProducers 43,64R,62 24_73,68 16,628.32 33_B32._D 8_236.88 7,739.27 9,331.gg 9,1
Others 3g,ggg.gg
! E.O, 226
b/ Real - Deflated using 6NPdeflator {1981=1Ng)
Source: Departmentof TradeandIndustry.
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duty drawback mechanisms. Exporters may avail of tax and duty
exemption on imported intermediate inputs via any one of the
following: (1) locating in an export processing zone (EPZ), (2)
using bonded manufacturing warehouse (BMW) facilities and (3)
importing under Customs Administrative Order 3-78 (CA0 3-78)° On
the other hand, tax and duty drawback on imported intermediate
inputs used in export production may be obtained under the
following modes: (i) individual drawback scheme of the Bureau of
Customs (BOC) and (2) fixed drawback scheme of the BOI.
The need for export promotion schemes has long been
recognized. These schemes were conceived and developed even
before the Aquino government took over. The performance of the
present government should then be judged according to how much
improvement it has implemented not only in terms of incentives
but also in terms of their administration.
Manasan (1989) Cook an inventory of the documentary and
other requirements for availing of the incentives under these
various export promotion schemes -- the BMW, the CAO 3-78, the
B0C drawback claims and fixed drawback schemes° Tables 20-24,
which were lifted from Manasan (1989), provide a summary of these
requirements. The procedures remain long and tedious. For
example, the documentary requirements for the establishment of a
BMW add up to at least 15 (Table 20). Foremost of these are (i)
a "formula of manufacture," and (2) a feasibility study_ There
are also fees which ma_e BMWs costly to operate_ CA0 3-78 is
intended for small and medium exporters (although customs common
bonded warehouses or CCBWs could also serve this purpose)°
Documentary requirements are also numerous (19) and complicated
(Tables 21 and 22). It also calls for the submission of "formula
of manufacture" and the posting of a re-export bond -- one and a
half times that under the BMW scheme.
The requirements for drawback claims under the BOC scheme
are presented in Table 23. Common with the other schemes are
requirements on the formula of manufacture and BOI certification
of nonavailability of local substitutes. Tax credits under this
system are available from 7 to 30 days upon submission of
necessary documents. The requirements and procedures to be
followed for firms to benefit from the fixed drawback system are
relatively simple (See Table 24). Tax credits are based on
predetermined rates set by the BOI.
Locating in EPZ provides the freest access to imported
inputs. The BMWs exempt importers from paying taxes and duties
on imported inputs but there are financial costs entailed in
maintaining them (supervision fees and re-export bonds)° The
procedures for BMWs are simpler relative to the other schemes but
they are still more tedious than in other countries which do not
require a "formula of manufacture" and posting of a re-export
Dond. The CCBW is a positive step aS it allows smaller exporter
to avail of expert incentives.
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Table 20: DOCUMENTARY AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS
FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF BMWs
WITHOUT SUBCONTRACTING
i. Instruments evidencing absolute ownership or lease contraet
covering the proposed warehouse;
2. Plant location showing means of access to the
property;
3. Plant layout showing and describing the size and
construction of the proposed warehouse together with
the intended use of each room, section or compartment
as well as the surrounding premises;
4_. Flowchart showing the nature of the work of manufacture/
processing;
5. Certified true copy of Registration Certificate with
the SEC together with the Articles of Incorporation and
By-Laws of Co-Partnership, as the case may be;
6. Certified true copy of Registration Certificate with
the BTRCP and BIR;
7. List of machinery and equipment;
8. Certified true copy of Certificate of Registration with
the BOI;
9. BOI Indorsement of the application (for garments, GTEB
issues the license to operate a BMW);
10. Copy of Inspection Permit froLn the Electricai Department;
ll. List of articles to be mansfactured;
12. List of all raw materials to be imported;
13. Formula of Manufacture, patterns or sketches of articles
to be exported;
14. Building (Mayor's) Permit; and
15. Copy of project feasibility study of BMW operation.
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continuation of Table 20 ....
WITH SUBCONTRACTING
i. Name of subcontractor;
2. Copy of contract with the subcontractor;
3. Certificate of accreditation of the subcontractor, if
already accredited by BOC; if the subcontractor selected
is not yet accredited, a letter of application of the
subcontractor together with other documents required
for the application;
4. Flowchart showing the specific processing stage to be
subcontracted; and
5. List of materials to be subcontracted.
PHYSICAL CONDITIONS
i. Plant Location - The proposed BMW shall be located in
an accessible place to ensure easy inspection by Customs
officials.
2. Compartments for Materials/Articles
a. Every BMW shall have permanent compartments separated
from the premises to be used exclusively for the
storage and safekeeping of all imported materials,
finished articles ready for export, and by
products/wastages;
b. The compartment shall be properly secured to prevent
any unauthorized person from having access thereto;
c. Such compartments shall each have two locks:
the key of one lock shall be kept by the Customs
bonded warehouse officer at all times and the key to the
other lock shall be kept by the operator;
d. The contents therein shall be properly arranged to
give all practicable convenience to authorized Customs
official making the required examination, inspection
or inventory.
3. Office Space for Customs Personnel - Accessible and
adequate office space shall be provided for the Customs
personnel to be assigned at the BMW.
FEES
i. Supervision fee equal to _45,000 per annum.
2. Performance Bond in the amount of _280,@_ to guarantee
compliance with laws and regulations affecting BMWs.
3. Be-export bond equivalent to the amount of duties, taxes
and other charges that would otherwise be due.
Source: DTI (1988).
Note: Table in Manasan (1989).
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Table 21: DOCUMENTARY REQUIREMENTS INAPPLICATION "
FOR DUTY EXEMPTION UNDER CAO 3-78 _
io CB IMPORT AUTHORITY (IA) ' "
Requirements for>issuance of IA:
1.1 Copy .of the'Certificate of Registration with the concerned
government agency_ such as the BOI, GTEB, PITC, or CB; in
the absence thereof, a Certificate of Qualification from
the BOC_
1.2 Copy of the processing agreement between consignee and
foreign principal or supplier, or the confirmed purchase
order or export L/C;
1.3 For regulated items, commodity clearance from the
appropriate government agency;
i_4 Proforma Invoice; and
1.5 Mark-up Computation Report approved by the CB Export
Department (this requirement can be waived for the first
shipment)°
Requirements for MCR
1.5ol Copy of Processing Agreement of Confirmed Purchase
Order (PO);
1.5o2 Copy of Certificate of Registration as export producer
with the BOI, CB, GTEB, EPZA or other government agencies
(for new applications); or
Copy of Certificate of Qualification (if not registered
with any government agency);
1.5.3 If the product's quantity and/or fee/billing is based
on the PO, Agreement or other documents - copy of
source document; or
If the product's quantity and/or fee/billing is estimated -
explanation on now the estimated were derived, i.e.,
assumptions used, basis of assumptions and supporting
documents/computations, if any;
io5.4 If the quantity/cost of the consigned materials is based on
the invoice or other documents -copy of Source document; or
If the quantity/cost of consigned materials is estimated -
explanation on how the estimates were derived i.e., assumption
used, basis of assumptions and supporting documents/
computations, if any; and
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continuation of Table 21 ....
1.5.5 Formula of Manufacture submitted .to the Bureau of Customs.
2. BOI certificate of non-availability
3. Re-export bond equal to one and one half times the ascertained duties,
taxes and other charges.
4. Certificate of Qualification (CQ)
Requirements for CQ ,. ..
4.1 Authentic copy of importer's Certificate of Registration with the
SEC, and the copy of the Articles of Incorporation or Articles
of Co-Partnership, for corporations or partnerships; and Certificate
of Registration with the BTRCP (formerly BDT) for sole proprietor-
ships;
4.2 Financial Statement certified by the BIR;
4.3 C_rtified copy of a valid and subsisting contract between the
importer and foreign supplier/buyer;
4.4 Formula of Conversion certified by the Department of Science and
Technology or any appropriate government agency;
4.5 Plant's location map; and
4.6 Sworn Statement stating the following:
i. That the materials are to be imported On consignment basis,
and are solely intended for commercial export or sample
purposes, based on the design/pattern prescribed by the
supplier/foreign buyer.
ii. Procedures to be followed in the production Of imported
materials; and
iii. That the applicant does not have the financial capacity to
make prior payment of the Customs dities, taxes and other
. charges, or does no:t have the necessary resources to establish
and operate a bonded manufacturing warehouse.
source:DT_ilg_8>.
Note: Table in Manasan (1989).
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Table 22: PROCEDURES FOR THE RELEASE OF IMPORTATION
UNDER CAO 3-78
he following are the procedures:
. The importer submits to the Entry Processing Division the following:
a. Import Entry and its supporting documents; and
b. Copy of the CQ.
. The Entry Processing Division processes the entry and stamps the name
"SMALL SCALE INDUSTRIES" and forwards the entry to the Special
Assessment Unit, Bonded Warehouse Division, Port of Manila (POM), or
the Warehousing Unit, Assessment Division, Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA).
C
. The Special Assessment of Warehousing Unit:
a. Undertakes an examination and appraisal of the shipment pursuant
to existing rules andregulations;
b. Verifies_ if • the imported materials as declared in the entry documents
are the ones specified in the CQ;
c. Adds the quantity of raw materials imported to date and checks if
the quantity specified in the contract was not exceeded; and
d. Transmits entry to the Bonds Division.
:. The Bonds Division, on the basis of the documents presented:
a. Checks: if there are due and demandable bonds from previous
importations;
b. Checks and approves ordinary re-export bonds; and
c. Transmits entry to the Cash Division, POM, or the Liquidation
Unit, Collection Division, NAIA.
_. The Cash Division or Liquidation Unit:
a. Receives entry and issues Permit to Deliver Imported Goods (POM)
or Gatepass (NAIA);
b. Forwards the same t0 the Piers and Inspection Division, POM, or
the Office of the Bonded Warehouse Supervisor, or the PKL Ware-
house, NAIA; and
c. Returns the entry to the Special Assessment Unit, Bonded Warehouse
Division, POM, or the Warehousing Unit, Assessment Division, NAIA.
Source: DTI (1988).
lore: Table in Manasan (1989).
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Table 23: REQUIREMENTS FOR BOC DRAWBACK CLAIMS
I. Import documents;
2. Export documents;
3. Bank credit memo or similar document evidencing remittance of
export proceeds;
4. Abstract of _ecord (.Form No. 1);
5. Certificate of non-availability of competitive substitutes for the
imported materials for regulated commodities under CB Circular 1029;
6. Formula of manufacture or conversion issued by DOST or other related
agencies;
7. Certificate of exportation (Form No. ll), if required; and/or
8. Constructive exportation documents (for indirect exporters);
a. Purcnase Order;
bo Sales Invoive
c. Delivery Receipt;
d. Certificate of sales and delivery confirmed by a Chief of the
Bonded Warehouse Division (Drawback Form No. l-A); and/or
e. Certificate of saies and delivery confirmed by EPZA (Drawback
Form No. l-B).
Source: DTI (1988).
S8
Table 24: REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES FOR FIXED DRAWBACK SCHEME
ocumentary Requirements: ..........
i. Export invoice;
2. Bill of Lading;
3. Bank Credit Memo;• and
4. A statement under oath stating that: .....
a. Taxes and duties have been paid on the raw materials/supplies;
b. Said raw materials/suppLies are not enjoying preferential rates; •
and
c. said raw materials suppLieS were purchased Within one (!)•year
from date o_ actual exportation.
rocedures for Availment of Standard ReDate_
i. Importer/claimant files application including the required documents
with the Tax Rebate Center (TRC) through the Records Section of
the BOI.
2. If the documents are complete, applicant pays the application fees
with the Cashier. Otherwise, documents are returned to the applicant
for •completion.
3. Tax Credit Application (TCA) is forwarded to the industry group
and evaluated by the Analyst.
4. The Analyst prepares an Evaluation Report and issues a Tax Credit
Certificate (TCC) amounting to the computed tax creditbased.on
the standard rate.
5. The deputized representative of the BOC and the BIR to the Center
sign the TCC's in the following manner:
a. The representative of the Customs Commissioner signs the tax
credits against tariff duties,
b, The representative of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
signs tax credits against value-added tax.
6. The TRC releases the TCC to the supplier/applicant within two (2)
working days from the time the application is officially accepted.
ource: DTI (1988).
ote: Table in Manasan (1989).
With regards the CAO 3-78, the support for small and medium
scale exporter is weakened by the complicated procedures and
higher re-export bond requirement. On the other hand, the
drawback system under BOC and BOI carries additional costs
arising from interest on advanced payment of duties and taxes.
The fixed drawback system is an improvement but few products are
covered.
Judging from the number of requirements and complexity of
procedures, availment of export incentives, particularly duty-
free importation of inputs, is still far from being automatic.
Furthermore, all exporters, except those located in EPZ, are
required to get a BOI certification of non-availability of
domestic substitute for the imported raw materials.
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